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Abstract
The Unites States and its allies confront a persistent and evolving threat from mis-
sile attacks as nations around the world continue to invest and advance their current
capabilities. Within the air defense context of a missile-and-interceptor engagement,
a challenge for the defender is that surface to air interceptor missile batteries often
must be located to protect high-value targets dispersed over a vast area, subject to
an attacker observing the disposition of batteries prior to developing and implement-
ing an attack plan. To model this scenario, we formulate a two-player, three-stage,
perfect information, sequential move, zero-sum game that accounts for, respectively,
a defender's location of batteries, an attacker's launch of missiles against targets, and
a defender's assignment of interceptors to incoming missiles. The resulting trilevel
math programming formulation cannot be solved via direct optimization and it is not
suitable to solve via full enumeration for realistically-sized instances. We instead uti-
lize the game tree search technique Double Oracle, within which we embed alternative
heuristics to solve an important subproblem for the attacker. We test and compare
these solution methods to solve a designed set of 26 instances of parametric varia-
tion, from which we derive insights regarding the nature of the underlying problem.
Whereas full enumeration required up to 8.6 hours to solve the largest instance con-
sidered, our superlative implementation of Double Oracle terminates in a maximum
of 3.39 seconds over the set of instances, with an average termination time of less
than one second. Double Oracle also properly identiﬁes the optimal SPNE strategies
in 75% of our test instances and, regarding those instances for which Double Oracle
failed, we note that the relative deviation is less than 2.5% from optimal, on average,
yielding promise as a solution method to solve realistically-sized instances.
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HETEROGENEOUS AIR DEFENSE BATTERY LOCATION: A
GAME THEORETIC APPROACH
I. Introduction
Missile attacks have long been viewed as a diverse and eﬀective alternative for air
attacks on enemy targets as they can be safer than using manned aircraft, and they
are also more capable of striking long range targets. Germany was one of the ﬁrst
nations to use missile attacks with the V-1 and V-2 missiles during World War II,
and since then missiles have been used in conﬂicts such as the Afghan civil war, the
Persian Gulf conﬂicts, and most recently in Syria [26]. There are over 20 countries
with missile system capabilities, and Russia, China, and North Korea are just a
few among those investing in advancing their current capabilities. A large concern
with missile attacks is that the missiles can be armed with a variety of warheads
such as conventional explosives, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons [26]. Long
range ballistic missiles are also capable of striking targets over 3,000 miles away with
decisive force. The diﬃculty in defending against such an attack is that, compared
to an attacker missile which only has to hit its target at a ﬁxed location, a defender
interceptor has to correctly locate, track, and strike the incoming missile in ﬂight [20].
The U.S. may not face the largest of threats from a missile attack, but there are several
U.S. allies that are well within range of a missile strike from neighboring countries.
For example, it is estimated that North Korea has as many as 1,000 ballistic missiles
capable of reaching South Korea and Japan [20]. In a similar manner, according to
Joint Publication 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, the predominant threat
is most likely from a rogue state or a terrorist group, rather than from a competing
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superpower [33].
As such, the U.S. seeks to research and develop air defense systems capable of pro-
viding high quality defense against missile attacks and has initiated several domestic
and joint programs to achieve this goal. The Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) Block IIA is
one such example which began in 2006 working with Japan as a partner. Since the
program began, approximately $3 billion has been invested [8]. Of the total amount,
the U.S. is responsible for slightly over $2 billion, which highlights just how costly
research and acquisition programs are. Considering only acquisition expenditures in
FY2015, the U.S. Department of Defense budget request for missile defense programs
was $8.2 billion [31]. For FY2016, the request rose to $8.8 billion, an increase of $600
million [32]. Again, both of these amounts do not include spending on research and
development for integration of newer technologies and weapon systems.
Acquisition expenditures are also broken down by Army, Air Force, Navy, or
Defense-wide spending, with missile defense being a capability within each of the
services. Of the $8.8 billion requested for missile defense in FY2016, over $5 billion
of the expenditure is classiﬁed as Defense-wide rather than being assigned to any
one service. A similar scenario applies to the FY2015 request [32]. A few of the air
defense systems operated by the U.S. that contribute towards defense spending include
the AEGIS missile defense, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD), and the Patriot/PAC-3 programs [32]. The
SM-3 Block IIA in development with Japan is scheduled to be deployed in Poland
beginning in 2018, adding to current assets available [27]. The SM-3 Block IIA is
also designed to be deployable on land or at sea, allowing for greater employment
ﬂexibility.
The preceding discussion primarily addresses current missile defense assets already
developed and available for acquisition. However, focus has also been shifting to
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research and develop directed energy and other kinetic missile defense capabilities.
The main reason for the growing interest in these areas is that they are better suited
for a large-scale missile attack and oﬀer a better cost return [12]. Speciﬁcally with
regard to directed energy, it oﬀers the advantage of a low cost per shot, large magazine
size, and rapid engagement of multiple targets necessary to counter a mass attack [12].
Current missile defense assets are very costly on a per missile basis, and their ability
to stop a large-scale missile attack has been questioned [13]. Newer technologies
look to combat these criticisms and, with the integration of such technologies, each
system oﬀers distinct characteristics that make it advantageous to utilize whether it
be coverage radius, probability of successful interception, or acquisition cost.
In a further attempt to combat such attacks, Goure [13] presents the idea of
regional missile defense architecture in which nations collaboratively work together
in order to provide protection over an area. Speciﬁcally mentioned is Israel's defense
network which consists of systems such as the Arrow, Iron Dome, and the Patriot.
Also discussed are various missile systems used by U.S. allies such as Japan investing
in the Patriot, the AEGIS missile system, and the SM-3 Block IIA, as well as South
Korea investing in systems such as the Patriot and THAAD. This helps illustrate the
need not only for organization over diﬀerent missile systems, but also between nations
to provide adequate defense against a large-scale attack.
The acquisition of air defense systems reﬂects only part of the challenge to decision
makers. Once acquired, air defense batteries must also be properly located to protect
the desired area. The mobility of air defense systems suggests they can be deployed in
what seems to be an inﬁnite number of locations, whereas the deﬁning characteristic
of an asset may make it advantageous for operation at a certain location over a
diﬀerent asset. The combinatorics of allocating SAM batteries would overwhelm
decision makers for even moderately-sized instances, and on large-scale instances it
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is almost impossible to consider all possible strategies. Meanwhile, a system having
a smaller range but a very high probability of successfully intercepting an incoming
missile may be preferable to one having a larger range but lower probability of success,
even if it means locating more assets within a given area. The dispersed nature of
cities and other defense objectives also causes trade-oﬀs between ensuring that high
value targets will be suﬃciently protected, and preventing other targets from being
left completely undefended, given limited resources to accomplish both objectives.
Once the defender allocates SAM batteries, a defense plan of how to use available
interceptor missiles still needs to be implemented to properly defend cities targeted by
an attack. Simply assigning each air defense asset to protect the city/cities closest to it
may result in a suboptimal strategy and cause incoming missiles to strike unopposed.
Even though a SAM battery is located at a city, it may be advantageous to use this
SAM to protect a second city farther out which only that SAM can protect, and
instead use surrounding SAMs to protect the ﬁrst city. A city may also need to be
protected using missiles from multiple surrounding SAM batteries resulting in a large
number of missile combinations, each of which yields a diﬀerent probability the city
survives. While strategies such as this that shift interceptor missiles around or use
missiles from multiple launching locations may be slightly harder to explore, it may
also result in a higher utility for the defender.
The acquisition process alone costs the U.S. billions of dollars every year, adding
to the importance of properly deploying and utilizing air defense assets. Once these
resources have been developed and acquired, a strategic decision remains concerning
where to locate the assets among the various sites. In today's ﬁscal environment, it
is imperative that resources are employed to maximum beneﬁt. If not properly dis-
tributed, there is the possibility that a larger number of defense sites will be required,
while some locations may not be as eﬀective or provide unnecessary coverage. Even
4
with all the advances in intelligence operations, threats can also be unpredictable.
Having defense plans and alternatives in place can make the diﬀerence between suc-
cessfully intercepting incoming missiles and cities being destroyed. Factors such as
cost, the strategic nature of locating resources, and the possibility of catastrophic loss
suggest the importance of missile defense and contribute towards the large amount of
resources and eﬀort dedicated toward improving upon current capabilities and their
strategic deployment around the world.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter II presents docu-
ments pertaining to U.S. Integrated Air Defense Systems, along with relevant research
and discussion that inﬂuence our problem formulation and methodology. Chapter III
presents the framework for our problem development and the associated model for-
mulations. Chapter IV discusses the solution methodologies examined to solve the
model formulations, and Chapter V provides the results and discussion on various
test instances. Chapter VI presents conclusions regarding the implemented solution
methods in addition to directions for further research.
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II. Literature Review
2.1 Missile Defense Background
Joint Publication 3-01 (JP3-01) deﬁnes Integrated Air Defense Systems not as a
formal system itself but as the aggregate of air and missile defense (AMD) systems
such as sensors, weapons, C2, communications, intelligence systems, and personnel
operating in a theater [33]. These systems can further be distinguished as active
AMD or passive AMD. Passive AMD relates to detection, warning, or concealment
to minimize the eﬀectiveness of enemy air and missile threats [33]. Our focus aligns
closer with active AMD which relies on the use of aircraft, weapons, sensors, and
other direct defensive measures to destroy or nullify the eﬀectiveness of air and missile
threats [33]. JP3-01 also discusses the importance of streamlined coordination in the
decision-making process, highlighting the importance of having air defense assets in
place and a strategy for defensive counter air operations, should they be necessary.
Finally, the JP3-01 mentions several diﬀerent AMD systems available to the defender
such as SAMs, AAA, and electronic warfare systems, which is a motivating feature
of this research.
2.2 Weapon Target Assignment Problem
The Weapon Target Assignment (WTA) Problem involves allocating m weapons
to n targets such that the expected damage to the enemy's targets is maximized [1].
WTA problems can further be divided into two groups: static or dynamic. Static
WTA problems assume a perfect information game with ﬁxed parameters in which
all targets are engaged in a single stage [1]. The static WTA problem is similar to
the one faced by the attacker in the second stage of our model, in which the attacker
must decide on a target assignment for each attacker missile. The dynamic WTA
6
problem is a multistage game, and strategies in each period of the game can change
based on information gained from previous stages.
Ahuja et al. [1] formulate the WTA problem as a minimum cost ﬂow problem,
and solve this formulation to obtain a lower bound on the objective function. The
author's main focus is then on applying a branch-and-bound algorithm to optimally
solve the WTA problem; this algorithm performs very well for small instances but
requires a long run time on larger-size instances. To counter the increased run time,
they apply a heuristic involving a Very Large-Scale Neighborhood (VLSN) search
technique to decrease the required computation time while still ﬁnding near-optimal
solutions for static WTA problem instances. Ahuja et al. [1] apply the VLSN to solve
larger instances of the WTA problem involving up to 200 weapons and 400 targets,
and they ﬁnd near optimal solutions in a matter of seconds.
2.3 Game Theory
Game theory is concerned with the allocation of resources in a strategic environ-
ment, wherein the term strategic implies that the payoﬀ to each player is a function
not only of their own action but also a function of the actions taken by other play-
ers. An important development in the ﬁeld of game theory is the concept of Nash
Equilibrium, and Myerson [24] discusses the development of economic theory and the
inﬂuence that John Nash had on the study of game theory. Nash [25] explains three
critical components to characterize a game: the players, their strategies, and their
payoﬀs. Nash illustrates that every ﬁnite game has an equilibrium point, where an
equilibrium point is the set of all pairs of opposing `good strategies'" [25]. Nash
equilibrium can also be interpreted as a set of strategies such that neither player has
an incentive to deviate from their strategy selection. Nash concludes by illustrating
how these concepts can be applied to a three-person poker game.
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Selten [29] used the concept of Nash equilibrium as it applies to sequential move
games to explain subgame perfect equilibrium (SPNE). Selten [29] explains that se-
quential move games can be broken into subgames that will themselves have subgame
perfect equilibria. Notably, Selten proves that any ﬁnite extensive form game with
perfect information will have at least one SPNE.
Galati & Simaan [9] apply the concept of Nash equilibrium to the Multi-Team
Target Assignment problem, a slight variation of the WTA. In the multi-team version,
instead of only one attacker allocating m weapons, there are now two teams facing
the WTA problem simultaneously. In addition, every weapon for one team is a target
for the other team, and vice versa [9]. Within the multi-team WTA problem, the
concept of Nash equilibrium as a solution has been criticized because it assumes that
the opponent is also implementing a Nash equilibrium strategy [9]. Galati & Simaan
[9] consider a random strategy, a unit greedy strategy, and a team optimal strategy
as three additional strategies that may be selected in the multi-team WTA problem.
The team optimal strategy is analogous to the WTA problem because it selects the
best allocation of weapons for the team, but it ignores possible strategy choices by
the opposing team. Of importance, Galati & Simaan [9] conduct a simulation in
which the players implement all 16 diﬀerent combinations of strategies against each
other. The results indicated that, on average, the unit greedy strategy appears to
be the worst, whereas the team Nash strategy returned the best payoﬀs. This result
supports the concept of Nash equilibrium (or SPNE) as a viable solution method.
Another criticism is that Nash equilibrium can be computationally expensive to
ﬁnd, especially as the strategy space grows. Due to this, Galati & Simaan [9] also
discuss a neighborhood search algorithm called ULTRA. The algorithm works by
ﬁxing the strategy of one team, and calculating a reaction strategy for the other team.
The strategy for one team can be represented as a vector ui, and a neighborhood is
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calculated that allows no more than ξ entries in ui to change [9]. The algorithm can
then be customized to ﬁnd very good solutions at the cost of computation time for
high values of ξ, or require a short run time but risk getting caught at local optima
for small values of ξ.
A common assumption in game theoretic models is that the players involved all act
rationally. In terms of the attacker, this implies that the attacker will choose to attack
those targets that result in the highest expected utility. Yang et al. [34] suggest that
it may also be worth exploring situations wherein the attacker occasionally selects
sub-optimal strategies, as a defense strategy that does not take into account the
behavior of the attacker may not be robust against attackers who use diﬀerent decision
processes. They mention a model named COBRA which attempts to correct for
this assumption, wherein the attacker is allowed to deviate to -optimal strategies.
Further, the optimal strategy may be computationally expensive to ﬁnd while -
optimal strategies are more readily available.
Yang et al. [34] then present Quantal Response Equilibrium as as solution method,
which allows players to select strategies that do not maximize their utility, and the
probability of selecting a non-optimal strategy increases as the cost of doing so de-
creases. They then present a MILP formulation and propose a heuristic called the
Best Response to Quantal Response (BRQR) that can be used to solve for quantal
response equilibrium strategies. BRQR is essentially a gradient ascent method that
starts with a randomly generated point and then moves in the direction that improves
the objective function.
2.4 Infrastructure Defense
Brown et al. [5] implement both bilevel and trilevel formulations on infrastructure
defense models in addition to providing several interesting comments about their
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development. They indicate that the attacker usually has the advantage, as the
defender is forced to protect a large target area with ﬁnite resources, while the attacker
can focus on a subset of this space and still inﬂict damage. One assumption made
by Brown et al. [5] is that a protected resource is invulnerable. With regard to air
defense models, this may not hold as a city that is covered by a SAM battery is not
necessarily protected or invulnerable.
A related application of bilevel optimization models is the r -Interdiction median
problem with fortiﬁcation (RIMF). This problem involves the defender determining
a strategy that selects a subset of facilities to protect in order to minimize damage
inﬂicted from the attacker's interdiction of r facilities [28]. The sequence of events
in RIMF problems is very similar to bilevel Defender-Attacker (DA) formulations in
which the defender ﬁrst allocates resources to protect a subset of facilities, and the
attacker then observes this strategy and decides which facilities to attack. Scaparra
& Church [28] also introduce an implicit enumeration algorithm to solve this bilevel
problem, and they provide results for the implementation of this algorithm on in-
stances of various size. They vary the number of attacker interdictions, r, and note
one interesting result: there are a few facilities that appeared in every defender for-
tiﬁcation strategy. These facilities indicate important locations, and thus should be
fortiﬁed whether or not an attack is expected on these facilities [28]. This extends
to the placement of SAM batteries, as the defender locating a SAM battery at a city
may deter the attacker from targeting this city with missiles.
An important aspect of game theoretic problem formulations is determining the
structure and relationship of components in a system, as it can aﬀect the strate-
gies employed by both the defender and the attacker. Hausken [18] discusses several
aspects related to infrastructure defense, along with potential characteristics to deter-
mine the value of each target. Of importance is the consideration that the defender is
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not only determining a strategy to protect against one attacker, but the possibility of
facing m independent attackers. Hausken [18] also argues that there are three main
factors that contribute to the valuation of a target: economic, human, and symbolic
value. The total value of the target can then be found by taking a weighted com-
bination of the above factors. Within our model, we do not necessarily require the
individual component values, only the ﬁnal value of each city.
Bier et al. [3] present a small-scale example related to infrastructure defense
consisting of only two targets, and an attacker selecting exactly one location to target.
They also assume a sequential game in which the defender ﬁrst decides to allocate
their resources between the targets, and the attacker then observes this allocation
and decides where to attack. Compared to our assumption of perfect information,
they assume that the attacker knows the defender's valuation of each target, but the
defender does not know the attacker valuations. Further, there is a probability pi of a
successful attack on target i which is a function of defender resource allocations and
targets selected by the attacker. Due to this, Bier et al. [3] point out the attacker
will not necessarily always attack the undefended target. For example, if the defender
chooses to locate their resource at City 1, then the attacker will still choose to attack
this city as long as the expected utility from attacking City 1 is greater than the
utility from attacking City 2 [3]. The importance of this result is that a lower-valued
target that is left undefended is not necessarily targeted by the attacker.
Bier et al. [3] continue to analyze the eﬀect of changing certain parameters in the
problem, such as the defender's valuation of each city, the defender's cost of allocating
defensive resources, and the attacker's valuation of each city. As expected, increasing
the defender's valuation of City 1 decreases the probability of a successful attack
on this city in the optimal solution. The attacker can also observe this change in
probability and inform them of the defender's valuations in a case where the attacker
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did not originally have this information, adding credibility to the assumption of a
perfect information game [3]. Strengthening the defensive resource commitment at
one location makes that target appear more important to the defender, so the attacker
will generally achieve a higher payoﬀ with a successful attack. The defender must
carefully weigh this decision, as strengthening one position means another location
may become more exposed, and after a point the attacker may decide to select an
easy target [3].
2.5 Target Hardening and Overarching Protection
An important distinction in infrastructure defense models is the characteristics
of the defender resources, speciﬁcally the capabilities they possess. There are two
main distinguishing classes for defender resources: Target Hardening and Overarching
Protection resources [17]. Target hardening refers to the case in which the defender
protects targets individually, whereas in overarching protection the defender is capable
of protecting multiple targets at once. Haphuriwat & Bier [17] argue that overarching
protection should be used by the defender when they have a large number of assets to
protect, and it will typically be more cost eﬀective than fortifying individual targets.
Overarching protection is also more applicable to models that assume a defender asset
located at city i is capable of protecting any city within a certain radius.
Haphuriwat & Bier [17] also discuss the idea of using power-law functions to
calculate the probability of a successful attack. Power-law functions relate to the
idea of diminishing returns in that the ﬁrst defender resource located at city i will
increase the defender's expected utility, but a second or third resource located at the
same city will not cause as large an increase. With regard to the defender, after a
certain point the probability of a successful attack will drop suﬃciently low that the
resources would provide a larger beneﬁt elsewhere [17]. This is generally true when
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the defender has one type of resource, however when the situation expands to multiple
diﬀerent defender or multiple diﬀerent attacker resources, the defender may want to
place two diﬀerent resources at the same city to protect against diﬀerent threats.
2.6 Maximum Expected Covering Location Problem
The set covering and maximum covering location problems are two diﬀerent prob-
lem formulations concerned with a facility or resource being located to cover a set of
demand nodes [7]. The maximum covering location problem as discussed by Church
& ReVelle [6] involves ﬁnding locations to place a set of facilities that maximizes the
total demand covered, subject to a maximum service distance. Although this is not
necessarily our objective, this is similar to locating a SAM battery such that it covers
the maximum number of cities. Daskin [7] presents a variation of this he denotes
as the maximum expected covering location problem (MEXCLP) which takes into
account that, just because a demand node is within range to be covered by a facility,
does not necessarily mean the facility will be able to service the demand node. As a
result, one possible objective is to not only maximize the number of demand nodes
covered, but also to subsequently maximize the number of nodes that are covered
more than once [7].
Daskin [7] also introduces the idea of dominated and non-dominated facility lo-
cations. A node j is said to be dominated if there exists another node k such that
locating a facility at node k covers every demand node covered by node j, while cov-
ering at least one additional node. The concept of dominance is important because
if node j is dominated, then we know that in the optimal solution to MEXCLP a fa-
cility will never be located at node j [7]. This can also be extended to the defender's
placement of SAM batteries based on the coverage radius and cities within range.
He then presents a heuristic to solve the MEXCLP and concludes by illustrating the
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performance on a frequently used 55-node network.
One key component of MEXCLP that Golalikhani & Zhuang [11] address is that a
defense asset located at a node i is capable of protecting not just that node, but nodes
within a certain radius of i. Many problem formulations discussed above assume that
a resource is only capable of protecting the node at which it is placed, which is not
necessarily the case. The capability of a defender resource protecting nodes around it
relates to the aforementioned discussion regarding overarching protection and gives
rise to the idea of a coverage parameter that indicates whether a resource located
at i is capable of reaching node j. Golalikhani & Zhuang [11] demonstrate that this
does not necessarily have to be based on the idea of geographical vicinity; it can be
based on functional similarity. A coverage radius is also a key beneﬁt to the defender
that increases their expected utility. Naturally this also lowers the attacker's utility,
and the decrease in the attacker's utility is typically larger than the increase in the
defender's utility [11].
2.7 Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
Brown et al. [4] discuss the growing importance of Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM)
Defense along with current TBM interceptor platforms and various existing analyt-
ical tools to aid in positioning missile defense assets. Brown et al. [4] make similar
assumptions to models previously discussed, notably that all parameters are common
knowledge, each attacker missile has a ﬁxed probability of kill, pk, and each intercep-
tor missile has a probability of successfully destroying an attacker missile. Similar
to Hausken [18], the value of a target can be broken down into four main factors:
criticality, vulnerability, reconstitutability (ability of a target to recover from dam-
age), and threat [4]. They also mention the advantage of adding secrecy to the model
(i.e., no longer an assumption of perfect information) and conclude by testing their
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formulation on a case study.
2.8 Security Games
Security games can be viewed as a variation of DA models and have been receiving
increased attention due to their highly strategic nature, along with the importance of
their applications. Security games involve a defender who places a set of resources on
a graph to protect vulnerable locations, and an attacker who subsequently chooses a
strategy to attack these locations [19]. As such, the development of security games
closely aligns to the formulation of our trilevel Defender-Attacker-Defender (DAD)
model. Jain et al. [19] use the Mumbai attacks that occurred in 2008 as a motivating
example for the application of security games and discuss two methods available to
help solve for defender and attacker strategies. They discuss a double-oracle algorithm
called RUGGED to solve for player strategies, and they also present an improved
algorithm called SNARES that is capable of solving problems much quicker and larger
in size. Tsai et al. [30] and Halvorson et al. [15] also discuss how to implement double-
oracle algorithms as they relate to security games and provide examples to illustrate
an implementation of the algorithm. Double oracle is explained in further detail in
the following subsection.
Arce et al. [2] consider the interaction between one player protecting n locations,
and another player deciding which locations to attack and with what resources. They
also bring up the concept of Colonel Blotto games in which each player allocates a
ﬁxed level of resources across N battleﬁelds. The player allocating more resources
to a battleﬁeld wins that battleﬁeld, and the objective is to maximize the number
of battleﬁelds won [2]. Arce et al. [2] also indicate the problem that resources allo-
cated to one battleﬁeld reduce the number of forces that can be allocated to other
battleﬁelds, highlighting how important it is to properly allocate resources. The bat-
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tleﬁeld allocation trade-oﬀ is related to the assumption that each SAM battery has
a ﬁxed radius r of cities it can protect, so the location of a SAM battery greatly
inﬂuences which cities are covered. Another assumption commonly made in Colonel
Blotto games is that the player who allocates more resources to a battleﬁeld wins
that battleﬁeld [2]. This is a simplifying assumption that does not necessarily hold
for air defense models. For example, if the defender places a SAM battery at city
i, it does not necessarily mean that full value of city i is added to the defender's
utility. The attacker could decide to attack city i, in which case there is a probability
of survival, or the attacker could overwhelm the city and attack with more missiles
than the defender could possibly launch interceptors against.
Korzhyk et al. [22] present an algorithm to ﬁnd an equilibrium in security games
that works by progressively adding defender resources. There are two important as-
sumptions underlying this algorithm. First, if a target is not attacked, then it does
not aﬀect either player's utility. However, in general a target that is not attacked
usually increases the defender's utility as this target is `safe'. The second assumption
is that the utility functions are additive, which simply implies that if the attacker
targets two cities, their utility is the sum of the utilities of attacking each target
individually [22]. If the defender has k resources to allocate, the algorithm works by
starting at a variation of the game assuming the defender has no resources and deter-
mines the equilibrium at this point (i.e., what targets are selected by the attacker).
This is calculated easily because the attacker will attack those targets that yield the
highest utility [22]. The basic premise of the algorithm is to calculate how much the
defender's resource level could increase until the attacker's strategy no longer is part
of a Nash equilibrium. The defender's resources are then increased by this amount,
and the strategies for the defender and the attacker are updated. A new equilibrium
is calculated, and the algorithm continues in a similar fashion until the amount of
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defender resource equals his actual commitment level k [22].
2.9 Double Oracle
Double Oracle is a solution method to ﬁnd a Nash Equilibrium (or subgame perfect
equilibrium) and solve either a normal form (or extensive form) game. The algorithm
initially considers a restricted set of players' strategies and iteratively identiﬁes the
NE (or SPNE) to solve this `restricted game' [19]. For each opponent's NE/SPNE
strategy, the adversary's best response strategy is identiﬁed among the entire strategy
space and added to the restricted game, terminating when no new strategies are
added to the restricted game. Jain et al. [19] also provide results indicating that
Double Oracle is capable of solving large-sized instances without a drastic increase in
computation time.
2.10 Heuristics
While exact solution methods exist, they may not always be practical to imple-
ment. For example, the required computation time may not be viable for large-size
problem instances, or a heuristic solution may be easier to discover and remain near-
optimal. In such cases, heuristics oﬀer an alternative solution method that are not
guaranteed to reach a global optimum, but are capable of greatly reducing the compu-
tation time. Simulated annealing and tabu search are two heuristic search techniques
that leverage diﬀerent algorithmic properties to ensure high quality solutions are
identiﬁed.
Simulated annealing is an iterative heuristic search technique based on the an-
nealing process of metal or glass, along with a heuristic described by Metropolis.
Metropolis ﬁrst used the heuristic to ﬁnd the equilibrium of atoms at a given temper-
ature but it has since been used in other combinatorial optimization problems [21].
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The heuristic begins with a current arrangement of atoms and generates a neighbor
based on a small perturbation to this current arrangement. If the energy of this
neighbor arrangement is less than the current arrangement, the neighbor conﬁgu-
ration becomes the new arrangement and the process repeats. If the energy of the
neighbor is greater than the current arrangement, the neighbor is moved to with some
probability based on the diﬀerence in energy levels [21]. Repeating this process sim-
ulates the movement of atoms until a steady state is reached. Metropolis' heuristic
has been applied to optimization problems typically by letting solutions represent the
arrangement of atoms and the objective function value of the solution represent the
energy level.
The annealing process is utilized to change the temperature of the system, which
aﬀects the probability that `worse' moves are accepted. Initially the temperature is
set very high so worse moves are selected with a higher probability which means that
more of the solution space is explored. Over time, the temperature begins to decrease
and the focus is shifted to reﬁning the current solution towards a local optima [21].
Tabu search is a metaheuristic that has been applied to a wide range of appli-
cations to include scheduling problems, the traveling salesman problem, and graph
coloring problems. Tabu search uses a memory-based structure to move from solution
to solution in an attempt to reach a global optimum [10]. Memory is primarily used
in two diﬀerent ways. The ﬁrst is to keep track of previous solutions visited and make
them tabu for the next k iterations, meaning they cannot be revisited. The goal of
this restriction is to allow moves away from local optima while still moving to high
quality solutions at each step [10]. This short-term memory is also used to prevent
cycling, wherein the algorithm would move away from a solution and immediately
return to it in the next iteration. The second type of memory is long-term based and
is used to periodically return to the best solution found so far, or move to a solution
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or set of the strategy space that has not been visited yet. This eﬀective use of memory
is a key attribute of tabu search that allows the heuristic to explore diverse portions
of the strategy space while attempting to avoid traps in local optima.
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III. Model Formulation
3.1 Problem Formulation
We consider a game consisting of a set N of cities each with some value vj ∈
R+, j ∈ N , a set T of Interceptor Missile (IM) types with mq SAM batteries of
type q ∈ T , and a total of n Attacker Missiles (AM). Each SAM battery with type q
missiles has deﬁning characteristics such as the probability of successfully intercepting
an incoming attacker missile and the maximum coverage radius of the battery that
distinguish it from other missile types. We formulate a two-player, three-stage, perfect
information, sequential move, zero-sum game as follows. The defender ﬁrst locates all
SAM batteries among a set F of possible locations. The attacker observes this action
and then decides on a single stage attack plan. The defender accurately detects this
attack upon initiation and launches interceptor missiles to protect some subset of the
|N | cities. The strategies we wish to ﬁnd are (a) where the defender locates its SAM
batteries in the ﬁrst stage, (b) how the attacker allocates its n missiles in the attack
plan in the second stage, and (c) how the defender launches interceptor missiles in
the ﬁnal stage.
3.2 Model Assumptions
There are several simplifying assumptions that allow us to formulate our two
models. The ﬁrst assumption is that all parameters are common knowledge. That
is, both players know how many IMs and of what type the defender has, and how
many AMs the attacker has. Both players also know the coverage radius of each
type of SAM battery and the probability that a single IM of type q successfully
intercepts an AM. Given the current state of technology and rapid communication
capabilities, this is a reasonable assumption that allows for a complete information
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game. In addition, we assume that all targets are valued equally by both the defender
and the attacker, a necessary assumption to model the game as zero-sum. We also
assume that an unintercepted AM will destroy a city with 100% probability. This is
a simplifying assumption that models the defender's utility in a worst case scenario.
This assumption also allows us to rule out certain attacker strategies, described further
in the following chapter.
There are several general assumptions made about the attacker, the ﬁrst being that
all AMs are launched in a single salvo. This assumption is made to reduce the strategy
space of the attacker and represents the case of an attack designed to overwhelm air
defenses and prevent the resupply of air defense batteries with additional interceptor
missiles. We also assume that the attacker has perfect information regarding the
location of all SAM batteries placed by the defender in the ﬁrst stage, as well as the
types of IMs at each SAM battery. This is an additional requirement for the complete
information game assumption. Lastly, we assume that all AMs are identical, implying
that they have the same ﬂight performance and destructive capabilities.
With regard to the defender, we assume that SAM batteries can only be placed
at predesignated locations, and at most one SAM battery can be placed at each
given location. Again, this is a simplifying assumption made to reduce the size of
the strategy space available. We allow the defender to have multiple diﬀerent types
of IMs, under the assumption that a SAM battery contains only one type of IM.
In doing so, we also assume that each IM has a ﬁxed probability of intercepting
an AM; and we note that this probability need not be the same for all IM types.
Since each SAM battery contains only one type of missile, each SAM battery has a
ﬁxed coverage radius but this radius may diﬀer based on the IM type at the battery.
The ﬁnal defender assumption is that no more than one IM will be launched against
each incoming AM. The Patriot PAC-3 and the THAAD missile systems previously
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mentioned are designed to intercept the attacker missile in the terminal phase of
ﬂight, meaning there is a small time window remaining to intercept the missile, and
if an interceptor fails the defender will not have time to launch a second IM. In the
second model formulation, a further defender assumption is made which we discuss
prior to presenting the model.
3.3 Model Formulation
The following section presents the model decision variables and parameters, fol-
lowed by a discussion about the model formulation.
Sets:
• N : the set of all cities.
• F : the set of possible SAM sites.
• T : the set of IM types.
Parameters:
• vj : the value of city j ∈ N .
• pq : the probability that a single IM of type q ∈ T successfully intercepts a
single AM.
• mq : the number of SAM batteries with IMs of type q ∈ T available to the
defender.
• n : the total number of AMs available to the attacker.
• cq : the number of IMs available per SAM battery with missiles of type q ∈ T .
• Aq : a coverage matrix for a SAM battery with missiles of type q ∈ T , indicating
whether a SAM battery at location i ∈ F is capable of protecting city j ∈ N .
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Decision Variables:
• dqi : 1 if a SAM battery with IMs of type q ∈ T is placed at location i ∈ F , and
0 otherwise.
• wj : Attacker's allocation of AMs to city j ∈ N .
• yj : 1 if city j ∈ N is protected, and 0 otherwise.
• xqij : Defender's allocation of missiles of type q ∈ T from a SAM battery placed
at location i ∈ F to intercept an AM launched against city j ∈ N .
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Trilevel DAD Model 1:
max
d
min
w
max
x,y
∑
j∈N
vjyj
∏
q∈T
p
( ∑
i∈F
xqij
)
q (1a)
s.t.
∑
i∈F
dqi = mq, ∀q ∈ T, (1b)∑
j∈N
wj = n, (1c)
∑
j∈N
xqij ≤ cqdqi , ∀i ∈ F, q ∈ T, (1d)
∑
i∈F
∑
q∈T
aqijx
q
ij ≤ wj, ∀j ∈ N, (1e)
∑
i∈F
∑
q∈T
aqijx
q
ij ≥ wjyj, ∀j ∈ N, (1f)
∑
q∈T
dqi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ F, (1g)
dqi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ F, q ∈ T, (1h)
yj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ N, (1i)
wj ∈ Z+, ∀j ∈ N, (1j)
xqij ∈ Z+, ∀i ∈ F, j ∈ N, q ∈ T. (1k)
The objective function (1a) represents the two-player, three stage optimization of
the expected value of the surviving cities, which the defender seeks to maximize via
SAM battery location, antecedent to the attacker seeking to minimize it by launch-
ing AMs, which precedes the defender's maximizing response of IM interception of
incoming AMs. Constraint (1b) requires that all SAM batteries with missiles of type
q are employed by the defender, and Constraint (1c) forces the attacker to use all
AMs available. Constraint (1d) requires that the defender launch no more than the
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total number of IMs available from each location i ∈ F . Constraint (1e) restricts the
defender to launch no more than one IM per incoming AM, whereas Constraint (1f)
requires that, in order for a city to be protected, the defender must launch an IM
against each AM targeting that city. Constraint (1g) enforces that no more than one
SAM battery will be placed at any location. Constraints (1h) and (1i) enforce binary
integer restrictions, respectively, on the defender's decision to place a SAM battery at
each location and the decision to protect a city, and Constraints (1j) and (1k) enforce
the integral restrictions on the AM and IM allocations, respectively.
Depending upon how the attacker allocates its n missiles, there are three main
possibilities a city can encounter at the beginning of the third stage. The ﬁrst simply
occurs when there are no incoming AMs to city j, that is wj = 0. In this case,
Constraint (1f) allows for the city to be protected (yj = 1). Since the right hand side
of Constraint (1f) equals zero, this implies that
∑
i∈F
∑
q∈T
aqijx
q
ij = 0 and equivalently
that
∑
i∈F
xqij = 0, resulting in the full value of the city being added to the objective
function (1a). The second situation occurs when the attacker launches AM(s) at a
city (wj > 0) and the defender decides not to protect the city. In this situation
yj equals zero, and since we assume that an unintercepted AM destroys a city with
100% probability, no value is added to the defender's expected utility (i.e., the city
is lost). The ﬁnal situation occurs when there are incoming AM(s) (wj > 0) and the
defender allocates enough IMs to protect the city (
∑
i∈F
∑
q∈T
xqij = wj). In this situation,
the expected value of the city depends on the number of each type of IM expended.
A feature of this model formulation is that the expected value of a city is a function
of the type of IMs used to protect the city and the number of each type of IM used.
For example, if there are two IM types (i.e., IM1 and IM2) and a city has ﬁve AMs
targeting it, then a total of ﬁve IMs must be expended to protect the city. These IMs
may also have diﬀerent pq-values, so using three of IM1 and two of IM2 will result
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in a diﬀerent expected value than when defending the city using two of IM1 and
three of IM2. The second model described below reduces this complexity by adding
a simplifying assumption.
3.4 Alternate Formulation
For this model, we assume that at most one type of interceptor missile may be
used to protect a city. This assumption is made in an attempt to reduce the IM com-
binations available to the defender. Without this assumption, the defender not only
has to decide to protect a city, but also must decide how many of each type of missile
to use when protecting a city. This assumption constrains the defender, and it pro-
vides a lower bound on the optimal objective function value to the original problem.
Lastly, this assumption serves to deconﬂict potential complications for the defender
where SAM batteries from diﬀerent locations have to communicate about which AM
each type of IM is targeting. A major beneﬁt of adding this assumption is it allows
us to formulate the model as an integer linear program in the ﬁnal stage, enabling a
wider variety of solution techniques to be leveraged. In adding this assumption, we
introduce a new binary decision variable ψqj ∈ {0, 1} indicating whether city j ∈ N
is protected using IMs of type q ∈ T . This variable equals 1 if true, 0 if false. In
this model, the previous parameters, sets, and decision variables remain the same as
those discussed above.
26
Trilevel DAD Model 2:
max
d
min
w
max
x,ψ
∑
j∈N
vj
∑
q∈T
ψqjp
wj
q (2a)
s.t.
∑
i∈F
dqi = mq, ∀q ∈ T, (2b)∑
j∈N
wj = n, (2c)
∑
j∈N
xqij ≤ cqdqi , ∀i ∈ F, q ∈ T, (2d)
∑
i∈F
aqijx
q
ij ≤ wjψqj , ∀j ∈ N, q ∈ T, (2e)∑
i∈F
aqijx
q
ij ≥ wjψqj , ∀j ∈ N, q ∈ T, (2f)∑
q∈T
dqi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ F, (2g)
∑
q∈T
ψqj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ N, (2h)
ψqj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ N, q ∈ T, (2i)
dqi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ F, q ∈ T, (2j)
wj ∈ Z+, ∀j ∈ N, (2k)
xqij ∈ Z+, ∀i ∈ F, j ∈ N, q ∈ T. (2l)
While a majority of the formulation remains the same as DAD Model 1, there
are three main changes. The ﬁrst is from Constraint (1e) to Constraint (2e). This
constraint now enforces that IMs of type q can only be used to defend city j if the
binary decision ψqj equals one. A new Constraint (2h) is also introduced that limits
at most one IM type to be used to protect a city. Constraint (2h) is known as a
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special ordered set of type 1 (i.e., SOS1), which refers to a set of variables in which
at most one variable can take a strictly positive value [14]. In DAD Model 2, SOS1
enforces the assumption that at most one missile type may be used to defend a city,
so at most one ψqj variable can be positive for each j ∈ N .
The other major change to this model is the reﬁnement of the objective function.
In Model 2, we now have an objective function that, for a ﬁxed attacker strategy wj =
w˜j, ∀j ∈ N , the resulting formulation is an integer program having a linear relaxation,
compared to the original formulation for which the corresponding relaxation was non-
linear and non-convex. This results from the added assumption because we now know
that, if there are ﬁve incoming AMs to a city and that city is protected, then ﬁve IMs
of the same type are used to protect that city. This is true for all cities, allowing us to
replace the
∑
i∈F
xqij in the exponent of the objective function (1a) with wj, substitute
ψqj for yj as appropriate, and replace the production summation with a summation,
resulting in a linear objective function in the ﬁnal stage.
The same previous scenarios again apply to each city upon completion of the
second stage. The ﬁrst two scenarios remain the same, whereas the third only diﬀers
slightly. In the new model, the defender does not have to decide how many of each IM
type are used to protect a city, only which type of IM is used to protect a city. Again,
this is a more constricting limitation for the defender but reduces the combinations
of decisions made in the ﬁnal stage.
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IV. Methodology
4.1 Full Enumeration
Focusing on DAD Model 2, for given solutions to the ﬁrst and second stages, we
are left to solve the integer linear program shown below in (3a) - (3g). One approach
to solve the DAD problem is to consider all possible defender and attacker strategy
combinations and solve the resulting ILP exactly. The diﬃculty with full enumeration
is that it quickly becomes intractable, even for small-size instances. Full enumeration
can also be represented in extensive form using a game tree as illustrated in Figure
1.
max
x,ψ
∑
j∈N
vj
∑
q∈T
ψqjp
wj
q (3a)
s.t.
∑
j∈N
xqij ≤ cqdqi , ∀i ∈ F, q ∈ T, (3b)
∑
i∈F
aqijx
q
ij ≤ wjψqj , ∀j ∈ N, q ∈ T, (3c)∑
i∈F
aqijx
q
ij ≥ wjψqj , ∀j ∈ N, q ∈ T, (3d)∑
q∈T
ψqj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ N, (3e)
ψqj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ N, q ∈ T, (3f)
xqij ∈ Z+, ∀i ∈ F, j ∈ N, q ∈ T. (3g)
If we ﬁrst restrict the problem to a case containing only one type of IM in a game
consisting of |F | possible SAM Locations with m SAM batteries, the defender can
allocate these SAM batteries
(|F |
m
)
diﬀerent ways. In allowing for SAM batteries with
multiple IM types, the strategy space for the defender begins to grow as it is now
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Figure 1. Example Game Tree
important to know not only where SAM batteries are located, but also what IM type
is at each location. Examining the case when the defender hasmq SAM batteries with
missiles of type q, mq ≥ 1 for all q ∈ T , the defender now has Sd =
∏
q∈T
(|F |−∑
i<q
mi
mq
)
strategies to consider. For example, if the defender has |T | = 2 IM types in which
m1 = m2 = 2 SAM batteries corresponding to each missile type, for an instance with
|F | = 6 possible locations, the defender can allocate these 4 total SAM batteries(
6
2
)(
6−2
2
)
= 90 diﬀerent ways.
Meanwhile, the attacker must decide on a missile allocation strategy w˜j to target
each city. In stage 2, the attacker can allocate these n AMs Sa =
(|N |+n−1
n
)
diﬀerent
ways. This is also a combinatorial problem that grows both as the number of cities
|N | increases and the number of AMs n increases. Considering a small |N | = 6 city
example again with n = 5 AMs, the attacker has
(
6+5−1
5
)
= 252 strategies available.
Using full enumeration there are Sd · Sa branches at the end of stage 2 which
requires the same number of integer linear programs be solved. Table 1 shows how
the number of stage 2 branches changes on a small instance where |T | = 2 and
|N | = |F | = 6 for increasing values of m1, m2, and n. The largest example given in
Table 1 occurs when m1 = m2 = 2 and n = 4, and even this relatively small instance
requires over 11,000 ILPs be solved. Table 1 helps illustrate how the strategy space
grows exponentially for increasing parameters of the problem, and thus why full
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enumeration is not suitable for larger sized instances.
Table 1. Strategy Space for |N | = |F | = 6 example
m1 m2 n Sd Sa Stage 2 Branches
1 1
2
30
21
630
2 1 60 1,260
2 2 90 1,890
1 1
3
30
56
1,680
2 1 60 3,360
2 2 90 5,040
1 1
4
30
126
3,780
2 1 60 7,560
2 2 90 11,340
4.2 Reduced Strategy Space
When implementing full enumeration we consider every possible defender and
attacker strategy. However, based on certain parameters and at diﬀerent stages of
the game, we can start to rule out strategies to reduce the size of the strategy space.
At the beginning of the game we are able to utilize the coverage matrices Aq to
eliminate certain defender strategies. Recall that a SAM battery at location i is
dominated by a SAM battery at location k if location k covers every city covered by
location i while covering at least one additional city. In allowing multiple IM types
we can no longer say that a SAM battery will never be placed at location i. For
example, the defender may want to place a SAM battery with IM Type 2 at location
k and a SAM battery with IM Type 1 at location i. What can be observed is that
the defender will never place a SAM battery at location i if there is no SAM battery
at location k. In this case the defender could move the SAM battery from location
i to location k and not lose any coverage while covering at least one additional city.
Utilizing this result, we can check all possible defender SAM allocation strategies to
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see if this relation is true, and if so we do not need to explore this portion of the
strategy space.
At the beginning of stage 2 we can leverage the fact that the defender has already
placed all SAM batteries to rule out certain attacker strategies. We assume this is
a perfect information game, so upon completion of stage 1 the attacker should know
the maximum number of IMs of each type that can be used to protect any given
city. Let θqj represent the number of IMs of type q that can be used to protect city
j, and ηj = max
q
θqj be the maximum number of IMs of all types that can be used
to protect city j. Once this is known, the attacker should not consider a strategy
that allocates wj ≥ ηj + 2 AMs to city j. We can make this statement due to the
assumption that any AM not intercepted destroys a city with 100% probability. So
if the attacker wants to overwhelm a city and destroy it with certainty, this can be
achieved with wj = ηj + 1 AMs. Any additional AMs targeting this city would be
wasted and are better utilized elsewhere. Again, we can check this relation for
each attacker strategy given the current defender strategy and, if any wj ≥ ηj + 2,
the resulting ILP does not need to be solved. There is a slight complication when
the attacker can overwhelm a majority of cities regardless of the defender's SAM
allocation, however the expression of Constraint (1c) and (2c) as an equality presumes
that the attacker does not have more than the number of AMs required to both
overwhelm the defender's IMs and destroy all uncovered cities. For such an instance,
we would express Constraint (1c) and (2c) as an inequality. Herein, we set aside
instances manifesting such an overmatch of capabilities and retain the form expressed
above.
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4.3 Double Oracle
Double Oracle is implemented by iteratively solving three main problems until
convergence. The ﬁrst component is coreLP which solves via enumeration a restricted
version of the game having a limited set of strategies available to the defender and
the attacker. Let Skd and S
k
a represent the set of strategies available to the defender
and the attacker during the kth iteration, respectively. The coreLP routine solves the
problem formulated in (3a) - (3g) to ﬁnd the SPNE for this restricted game. S0d and
S0a are initialized by selecting an arbitrary set of defender and attacker strategies;
however, initializing these sets with smart strategies may improve the performance
of the algorithm as discussed by Jain et al. [19]. The defender and attacker SPNE
strategies returned from coreLP are denoted sˆd and sˆa respectively.
Defender Oracle
The Defender Oracle subproblem solves for the defender's best response for a
ﬁxed AM allocation sˆa. This problem is also formulated in (4a) - (4j). In Defender
Oracle the defender wants to ﬁnd the best SAM allocation strategy in stage 1 and
IM allocation in stage 3 to maximize the expected value of surviving cities. Since
the attacker's strategy is ﬁxed in this problem, Defender Oracle is an integer linear
program which can be solved exactly. The defender's best response is then used
to update the set of strategies currently available. Let s¯d represent the defender's
best response found using Defender Oracle. Upon completion of iteration k, we let
Skd ← Sk−1d
⋃
s¯d.
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max
d,x,ψ
∑
j∈N
vj
∑
q∈T
ψqjp
wj
q (4a)
s.t.
∑
i∈F
dqi = mq, ∀q ∈ T, (4b)∑
j∈N
xqij ≤ cqdqi , ∀i ∈ F, q ∈ T, (4c)
∑
i∈F
aqijx
q
ij ≤ wjψqj , ∀j ∈ N, q ∈ T, (4d)∑
i∈F
aqijx
q
ij ≥ wjψqj , ∀j ∈ N, q ∈ T, (4e)∑
q∈T
dqi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ F, (4f)
∑
q∈T
ψqj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ N, (4g)
ψqj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ N, q ∈ T, (4h)
dqi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ F, q ∈ T, (4i)
xqij ∈ Z+, ∀i ∈ F, j ∈ N, q ∈ T. (4j)
Attacker Oracle
The Attacker Oracle subproblem formulated in (5a) - (5i) is used to solve for the
attacker's best response for a ﬁxed defender SAM allocation strategy sˆd. This is a
bilevel nonlinear integer formulation as the defender's SAM locations are ﬁxed, but
the defender has yet to decide which IMs to launch to protect the respective cities.
We utilize two diﬀerent heuristics described further below to solve for the attacker's
best response s¯a, upon which we similarly let S
k
a ← Sk−1a
⋃
s¯a.
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min
w
max
x,ψ
∑
j∈N
vj
∑
q∈T
ψqjp
wj
q (5a)
s.t.
∑
j∈N
wj = n, (5b)
∑
j∈N
xqij ≤ cqdqi , ∀i ∈ F, q ∈ T, (5c)
∑
i∈F
aqijx
q
ij ≤ wjψqj , ∀j ∈ N, q ∈ T, (5d)∑
i∈F
aqijx
q
ij ≥ wjψqj , ∀j ∈ N, q ∈ T, (5e)∑
q∈T
ψqj ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ N, (5f)
ψqj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ N, q ∈ T, (5g)
wj ∈ Z+, ∀j ∈ N, (5h)
xqij ∈ Z+, ∀i ∈ F, j ∈ N, q ∈ T. (5i)
The ﬁrst heuristic implemented to solve Attacker Oracle is simulated annealing.
The heuristic starts with the initial feasible strategy sˆa from coreLP and utilizes a
neighborhood search technique to explore the strategy space while iteratively up-
dating the current attacker strategy, denoted s¨a. The neighborhood deﬁnition is
inﬂuenced by that used by Han et al. [16] in examining a related problem assuming
only one type of IM is available to the defender. The set of neighbor strategies is
generated by moving one AM from city j, wj > 0, to some other city j
′, j 6= j′. In
a three city example, if the current strategy is s¨a = [3 5 0], the neighbor strategies
would be
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neighbors([3 5 0]) =

2 6 0
2 5 1
4 4 0
3 4 1

.
Instead of evaluating the entire neighborhood, a single random neighbor is selected
to compare against the current strategy. If the neighbor results in a lower expected
value of surviving cities, then s¨a is updated. If the neighbor strategy results in an
expected survival value greater than the current strategy, then it is probabilistically
selected to replace the current solution based on the diﬀerence in objective function
values and the current temperature of the system. The starting temperature is set
very high, so there is initially a high probability that worse strategies are adopted
and the solution space can be explored, while over time the temperature slowly cools
so the heuristic can converge to a local optimum. The heuristic continues until the
temperature is suﬃciently small, at which point the best strategy found is returned
as s¯a.
The second heuristic implemented is tabu search which also utilizes the same
neighborhood deﬁnition. Compared to simulated annealing, tabu search evaluates
each neighbor strategy for the expected city survival value based on the defender's
best response in stage 3. The neighborhood strategy that results in the lowest ex-
pected value is selected to update the current strategy, regardless of its relation to
the previous strategy. This implies that we allow moves to strategies that increase
the value of surviving cities (i.e., worse for the attacker) in an attempt to escape
local optima. The current strategy s¨a is then placed on the tabu list for the next l
iterations, which prevents us from moving away from one strategy and returning to it
in the following iterations. The heuristic terminates after a pre-determined number
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of iterations at which point the best strategy found is returned as s¯a.
If no new defender and attacker strategies are added, meaning Skd = S
k−1
d and S
k
a =
Sk−1a , then the algorithm has converged and sˆd and sˆa are accepted as the predicted
SPNE strategies to the full game. If new strategies are added, the algorithm repeats,
starting with coreLP and solving for new best response strategies.
Since simulated annealing and tabu search are both heuristic approaches to solve
Attacker Oracle, there is no guarantee that they will return the optimal attacker
strategy s¯a. Even so, both heuristics have unique features that can be utilized to
ensure high quality solutions are still found. While McMahan et al. [23] proved
that Double Oracle will converge to the optimal solution when mixed strategies are
considered, we only consider pure strategies. In the context of this game, the issue is
not necessarily that we do not consider mixed strategies, rather that we do not solve
for alternative optima, if they exist. This implies that even if the heuristics used in
the Attacker Oracle are exact, there is still the possibility that Double Oracle will fail
to properly identify the SPNE.
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V. Computational Results
5.1 6 City Network
To test the performance of the various solution methods, we use the same network
Daskin [7] examined in the MEXCLP. The topology of this network along with the
value assigned to each city is illustrated in Figure 2. For all instances we test, it is
assumed that |N | = 6, |F | = 6, and |T | = 2. Test instances are based on those used
by Han et al. [16] in examining a single IM type problem. We ﬁrst initialize Double
Oracle (DO) with a single defender strategy of placing SAM batteries in sequential
order at the most valuable city without a SAM battery and single attacker strategy
of all AMs targeting the most valuable city.
A B
C
D E
F
1 1
1
5 310
10
8
4
8
4
11 11
10
7 7
1 Value at city j, vj
δ Distance between i and j
A
City j
Figure 2. 6-city Network
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5.2 Heuristic Parameters
Within DO using Simulated Annealing (DO/SA) in Attacker Oracle, the main
algorithmic parameters are the initial temperature t0, the temperature cooling scheme,
and the stopping condition. These parameters were tested on smaller instances to
determine which settings would likely yield the desired results. For all ﬁnal test
instances the initial temperature is t0 = 10, 000 and the temperature at iteration
k is updated according to the function tk = 0.95 · tk−1. In our implementation,
we complete 250 outer iterations with 5 iterations at each temperature for a total
of 1,250 iterations. This implies that the temperature at the end of the search is
near 0.028. We use the same probability function of accepting a worse strategy
discussed by Kirkpatrick et al. [21] of p = e∆/tk , where ∆ represents the diﬀerence
in objective function values between the current strategy and the neighbor strategy.
The stochastic nature of DO/SA results in the possibility that diﬀerent solutions will
be returned each time it is implemented regardless of initialization strategies.
When implementing DO using Tabu Search (DO/TS) in Attacker Oracle, the
current attacker strategy will have at most |N | · (|N | − 1) = 30 neighbors for this
6 city network, so we evaluate the whole neighborhood in Attacker Oracle. This
implies that DO/TS is deterministic in the sense that running the algorithm multiple
times will return the same value, assuming the same defender/attacker initialization
strategies are used each time. On a larger network, the neighborhood size begins to
grow, and a subset of the neighborhood will likely need to be selected. Once a strategy
has been selected for adoption, it is placed on the tabu list for the next 3 iterations.
Any duration greater than one iteration will be suﬃcient to prevent us from cycling
between strategies, and 3 was selected to meet this requirement. To determine the
number of iterations to complete within Attacker Oracle, we ﬁrst consider the worst
case available. In such a scenario the attacker is using a strategy in which all AMs
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target the last city when the optimal strategy is to have all AMs target the ﬁrst
city. Neighbor solutions will be generated and evaluated, and one AM will be moved
from the last city to the ﬁrst city each time. After completion of n iterations the
best response strategy will be reached. Since Attacker Oracle is solved via a heuristic
there is no guarantee this will be the solution to the full game. As such, we may not
want to complete all n iterations, especially for large values of n. Instead, we simply
want to ﬁnd a better attacker response, similar to Jain et al. [19]. Upon testing the
eﬀect diﬀerent iteration lengths have on solution quality in smaller instances, we ﬁx
the number of iterations in Attacker Oracle within DO/TS at 6.
5.3 Test Instance Results
Tables 2 and 3 present the various problem instances we test. In both of these
tables, IM Type 1 is identical and intended to represent a baseline IM performance.
For comparison, IM Type 2 reﬂects a more capable missile with a higher pq and
coverage radius; however, fewer SAM batteries of this type are available. We further
distinguish IM Type 2 in terms of the number of IMs per SAM battery. IM Type 2A
reﬂects a scenario in which the second IM type has an improved performance over the
baseline, but fewer IMs are available. Thus, in Table 2 we set c2 =
3
4
c1 rounded up
to the nearest even number. For example, this situation could be represented by the
comparison of the PAC-3 and HIMARS. In contrast, IM Type 2B again represents a
more capable missile, but with more IMs available than the baseline. For IM Type
2B we let c2 =
5
4
c1 rounded up to the nearest even number as illustrated in Table
3. This relation could be reﬂected by the comparison of the PAC-3 and THAAD for
example.
Tables 2 and 3 also report the computation time required to solve each instance
using full enumeration, reduced enumeration, DO/SA, and DO/TS. All instances
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were solved using MATLAB calling IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimization Studio version
12.6 on an Intel(R) Xeon E5-1620 3.6 GHz processor having 32 GB memory.
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Table 2. Problem Instances IM Type 2A
IM Type 1 IM Type 2A Computation Time (sec)
Instance n m1 c1 p1 r1 m2 c2 p2 r2 Full Reduced DO/SA DO/TS
1 5 2 12 0.5 6 1 10 0.6 9 15.84 12.41 4.36 0.33
2 10 1 8 0.3 6 1 6 0.4 9 94.98 36.31 8.29 1.37
3 10 1 16 0.3 6 1 12 0.4 9 93.62 34.00 8.05 1.45
4 10 1 8 0.7 6 1 6 0.8 9 95.65 36.94 10.87 1.55
5 10 1 16 0.7 6 1 12 0.8 9 91.63 35.44 7.18 0.75
6 10 3 8 0.3 6 1 6 0.4 9 200.07 157.34 6.50 1.11
7 10 3 16 0.3 6 1 12 0.4 9 187.12 148.42 2.93 0.60
8 10 3 8 0.7 6 1 6 0.8 9 196.53 162.81 8.16 0.73
9 10 3 16 0.7 6 1 12 0.8 9 187.84 148.47 4.37 0.25
10 15 2 12 0.1 6 1 10 0.2 9 1002.22 487.95 14.75 1.93
11 15 2 4 0.5 6 1 4 0.6 9 1140.25 192.52 7.26 1.82
12 15 2 12 0.5 6 1 10 0.6 9 1002.77 481.16 9.67 1.49
13 15 2 20 0.5 6 1 16 0.6 9 979.47 471.74 6.13 1.04
14 15 2 12 0.9 6 1 10 1 9 1006.36 485.23 10.33 0.68
15 15 3 12 0.5 6 2 10 0.6 9 1332.72 1353.93 11.41 1.71
16 20 1 8 0.3 6 1 6 0.4 9 1839.85 172.12 20.65 3.66
17 20 1 16 0.3 6 1 12 0.4 9 1723.53 356.48 9.28 2.12
18 20 1 8 0.7 6 1 6 0.8 9 1876.66 176.08 15.16 2.34
19 20 1 16 0.7 6 1 12 0.8 9 1733.28 346.94 9.62 1.40
20 20 2 8 0.6 6 2 6 0.7 9 13422.77 7701.52 40.63 5.84
21 20 3 8 0.3 6 1 6 0.4 9 4210.00 1986.72 11.35 1.86
22 20 3 16 0.3 6 1 12 0.4 9 4079.74 2421.24 6.64 1.89
23 20 3 8 0.7 6 1 6 0.8 9 4915.87 2108.95 19.66 1.26
24 20 3 16 0.7 6 1 12 0.8 9 3571.13 2433.24 14.79 1.53
25 25 2 12 0.5 6 1 10 0.6 9 10333.44 2986.15 16.29 2.76
26 25 2 12 0.7 6 2 10 0.8 9 31282.68 22650.34 58.93 3.53
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Table 3. Problem Instances IM Type 2B
IM Type 1 IM Type 2B Computation Time (sec)
Instance n m1 c1 p1 r1 m2 c2 p2 r2 Full Reduced DO/SA DO/TS
1 5 2 12 0.5 6 1 16 0.6 9 15.69 12.12 4.14 0.33
2 10 1 8 0.3 6 1 10 0.4 9 92.09 34.14 7.78 1.20
3 10 1 16 0.3 6 1 20 0.4 9 94.17 34.11 7.71 1.62
4 10 1 8 0.7 6 1 10 0.8 9 93.19 33.76 8.32 0.91
5 10 1 16 0.7 6 1 20 0.8 9 92.99 33.83 8.29 0.68
6 10 3 8 0.3 6 1 10 0.4 9 191.76 152.25 2.82 0.56
7 10 3 16 0.3 6 1 20 0.4 9 189.93 150.02 2.82 0.60
8 10 3 8 0.7 6 1 10 0.8 9 190.87 151.26 4.27 0.25
9 10 3 16 0.7 6 1 20 0.8 9 189.93 150.84 4.27 0.25
10 15 2 12 0.1 6 1 16 0.2 9 971.47 470.57 11.24 1.93
11 15 2 4 0.5 6 1 6 0.6 9 1183.04 339.48 20.00 2.05
12 15 2 12 0.5 6 1 16 0.6 9 980.67 469.00 4.69 0.87
13 15 2 20 0.5 6 1 26 0.6 9 979.13 482.78 7.95 0.88
14 15 2 12 0.9 6 1 16 1 9 976.86 471.09 4.20 1.48
15 15 3 12 0.5 6 2 16 0.6 9 997.67 992.51 6.14 0.85
16 20 1 8 0.3 6 1 10 0.4 9 1808.44 325.28 31.59 2.79
17 20 1 16 0.3 6 1 20 0.4 9 1652.89 383.88 21.65 1.99
18 20 1 8 0.7 6 1 10 0.8 9 1826.66 331.70 19.84 2.66
19 20 1 16 0.7 6 1 20 0.8 9 1647.21 385.37 9.04 2.02
20 20 2 8 0.6 6 2 10 0.7 9 8659.12 6921.97 22.59 2.12
21 20 3 8 0.3 6 1 10 0.4 9 4226.24 2719.01 9.14 1.79
22 20 3 16 0.3 6 1 20 0.4 9 3404.64 2623.69 14.17 1.58
23 20 3 8 0.7 6 1 10 0.8 9 4219.76 2654.47 16.30 2.13
24 20 3 16 0.7 6 1 20 0.8 9 3403.84 2706.83 12.99 0.52
25 25 2 12 0.5 6 1 16 0.6 9 9716.15 3820.85 9.42 2.75
26 25 2 12 0.7 6 2 16 0.8 9 19993.36 15858.60 32.85 1.33
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As expected, full enumeration takes a considerable amount of time to solve making
the method impractical for even moderately-sized instances. Instance 26, the largest
size instance in which Sd ·Sa =
(
6
2
)(
6−2
2
) ·(6+25−1
25
)
= 12, 825, 540, required just over 8.6
hours and 5.5 hours to evaluate the game tree and identify the SPNE for IM Types
2A and 2B respectively. Although full enumeration is computationally expensive, it
does explore the whole game tree, so we are guaranteed to ﬁnd the equilibrium.
In all but one instance (instance 15 for IM Type 2A), reduced enumeration was
able to reduce the computation time, on average approximately 50% faster than full
enumeration for IM Type 2A and approximately 45% faster for IM Type 2B, but it
still required up to 6.3 hours to complete. This method again explores the game tree
similar to full enumeration, with the added beneﬁt in that it does not evaluate any
strategy combination in which either the defender or attacker are using a dominated
strategy. While reduced enumeration is guaranteed to ﬁnd the SPNE with a potential
reduction in computation time, it still remains impractical as a method for larger
instances.
Tables 4 and 5 provide the expected value of surviving cities for each instance when
implementing DO/SA, and Tables 7 and 8 provide the corresponding results when
implementing DO/TS. Since reduced enumeration is an exact method implemented
primarily to compare the solution time with full enumeration, it has been omitted
from Tables 4 - 8. Each of the tables also compare the defender and attacker strategy
found using Double Oracle with the optimal strategy identiﬁed using full enumeration,
as reported in columns 6 and 7. If the strategies identiﬁed by full enumeration and
Double Oracle are the same, the column contains a 1; else the identiﬁed solutions diﬀer
and the entry is a 0. These columns provide potential indications of why Double
Oracle failed to identify the SPNE or, in some instances, identify the presence of
alternative optima.
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Table 4. DO/SA Expected Survival Value IM Type 2A
Value
DO/SA strategy
comparison with Full
Instance Full DO/SA
Relative
Gap SA
Absolute
Gap SA
Defender
Strategy
Attacker
Strategy
1 9.960 9.960 0 0
2 2.270 2.270 1 1
3 2.410 2.410 0 1
4 7.400 7.400 0 1
5 9.921 9.821 -1.01% -0.100 0 0
6 2.710 2.610 -3.69% -0.100 0 1
7 2.820 2.820 1 1
8 8.924 8.711 -2.39% -0.213 0 0
9 10.581 10.581 1 1
10 0.150 0.146 -2.67% -0.004 0 0
11 2.046 2.023 -1.12% -0.023 0 0
12 3.192 3.192 1 0
13 3.401 3.401 1 1
14 10.430 11.000 5.47% 0.570 0 0
15 3.874 3.874 0 1
16 0.179 0.116 -35.33% -0.063 0 0
17 0.274 0.188 -31.55% -0.087 0 0
18 2.640 2.420 -8.33% -0.220 0 0
19 3.883 3.883 0 1
20 3.317 3.312 -0.15% -0.005 0 0
21 0.374 0.374 1 0
22 0.463 0.462 -0.30% -0.001 0 0
23 4.345 3.984 -8.31% -0.361 0 0
24 5.303 5.303 1 1
25 1.026 0.918 -10.55% -0.108 0 0
26 4.728 4.730 0.05% 0.002 0 0
Note: Text in bold indicates DO reached the SPNE
In terms of required computation time, DO/SA oﬀers a signiﬁcant improvement
over full enumeration. The average time required for DO/SA to solve the 26 test
instances is approximately 13.2 seconds and 12.7 seconds for IM Type 2A and IM
Type 2B, respectively, with the longest time just under 60 seconds. Whereas DO/SA
is signiﬁcantly faster than full enumeration, there are several instances for which it
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Table 5. DO/SA Expected Survival Value IM Type 2B
Value
DO/SA strategy
comparison with Full
Instance Full DO/SA
Relative
Gap SA
Absolute
Gap SA
Defender
Strategy
Attacker
Strategy
1 9.960 9.960 0 0
2 2.410 2.410 0 1
3 2.410 2.410 0 1
4 9.921 9.821 -1.01% -0.100 0 0
5 9.921 9.821 -1.01% -0.100 0 0
6 2.820 2.820 1 1
7 2.820 2.820 1 1
8 10.581 10.581 1 1
9 10.581 10.581 1 1
10 0.150 0.138 -8.00% -0.012 0 0
11 2.521 2.521 1 1
12 3.401 3.401 1 1
13 3.401 3.401 1 1
14 18.900 14.900 -21.16% -4.000 0 0
15 3.874 3.874 0 1
16 0.274 0.274 1 1
17 0.326 0.326 1 1
18 3.882 3.756 -3.24% -0.126 0 0
19 5.373 5.209 -3.05% -0.164 0 0
20 4.132 4.137 0.12% 0.005 1 0
21 0.461 0.462 0.08% <0.001 1 0
22 0.500 0.500 1 1
23 5.295 5.197 -1.86% -0.098 0 0
24 6.582 6.582 1 0
25 1.196 1.196 1 1
26 5.381 5.386 0.09% 0.005 0 0
Note: Text in bold indicates DO reached the SPNE
fails to identify the SPNE. Tables 4 and 5 provide the optimality gap for the instances
in which Double Oracle failed to properly identify the SPNE, and Table 6 provides
selected aggregate performance measures for the instances where it failed (across all
52 total instances). Table 6 shows that simulated annealing fails to identify the SPNE
more often below the optimal than above. DO/SA has a maximum optimality gap of
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35.33% when it fails below the SPNE, but is only 5.47% when it fails above the SPNE.
The average diﬀerence in values with full enumeration is 0.13 for IM Type 2A and
0.46 for IM Type 2B, with the largest diﬀerence in values at 4.00 for instance 14 on
IM Type 2B. Further, the instance with the largest relative optimality gap does not
necessarily correspond to the instance with the largest absolute gap. It is important
again to note that, due to the stochastic nature of simulated annealing as a heuristic,
running DO/SA multiple times will most likely return diﬀerent values. Thus, we
could run DO/SA again and might reach the SPNE in more (or fewer) instances,
however the results provided are from a single run through all the instances.
Table 6. DO Performance with Single Strategy Initialization
DO/SA DO/TS
Below SPNE Above SPNE Below SPNE Above SPNE
# of instances 19 5 19 4
Average % -7.62% 1.16% -13.13% 1.55%
Max % -35.33% 5.47% -41.00% 3.97%
Average Value Diﬀ -0.310 0.117 -0.264 0.080
Max Value Diﬀ -4.00 0.570 -0.960 0.172
DO/TS again oﬀers a signiﬁcant improvement in computation time over full enu-
meration while also performing faster than DO/SA. Compared to full enumeration
which required up to 8.6 hours to solve, DO/TS required a maximum of 5.84 sec-
onds before completion. For IM Type 2A, DO/TS terminated in an average of 1.73
seconds, whereas for IM Type 2B, DO/TS terminated in an average of 1.39 seconds.
While DO/TS is signiﬁcantly faster, there are again instances where it fails to iden-
tify the SPNE. Tables 7 and 8 again report the relative and absolute gap for these
instances. For IM Type 2A, DO/TS reached the optimal objective function value in
46% of the instances, while IM Type 2B was slightly higher at 65% of the instances.
The optimality gap for instances where DO/TS did fail is as high as 41% in multiple
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instances, however the optimal SPNE value for these instances are also very small so
even small deviations will appear as large relative deviations. For example, instance
16 and 17 for IM Type 2B both have relative optimality gaps above 40%, but the
absolute deviation is only 0.112 and 0.134, respectively. For all 52 test instances, the
maximum absolute deviation from the SPNE value is 0.960 with an average deviation
of approximately 0.264.
Table 6 again illustrates that, in the instances when DO/TS did fail to prop-
erly ﬁnd the SPNE, it tended to return an expected value lower than the optimal
value. Outcomes such as these indicate that Double Oracle converged prematurely
and portions of the game tree where the optimal strategies exist were never explored.
In every instance for which Double Oracle returned a smaller value than the SPNE,
the defender strategy returned failed to match that of full enumeration. Conversely,
when Double Oracle returned a larger expected value, the conjecture is that Attacker
Oracle failed to generate the correct strategy. This is indeed a likely cause since we
use a heuristic to solve Attacker Oracle, but it cannot be stated with certainty in the
absence of further information.
Table 7 shows there are two instances where Double Oracle failed and the attacker
strategy matched that of full enumeration (i.e., instances 6 and 16). These occurrences
indicate that Double Oracle failed due to only considering pure strategies. Due to the
current formulation, in order for the defender to have a mixed strategy, the strategies
in the support must result in the same optimal SPNE value. Otherwise, the defender
would always select the strategy that resulted in the larger value. Thus, the cause of
this can also be attributed to not solving for alternative optima, if they exist. Lastly
of interest are those instances for which Double Oracle returned the same value as
full enumeration, and either the defender or attacker strategy diﬀer (e.g., instances 1
and 12). These occurrences indicate the presence of alternative optima.
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Table 7. DO/TS Expected Survival Value IM Type 2A
Value
DO/TS strategy
comparison with Full
Instance Full DO/TS
Relative
Gap TS
Absolute
Gap TS
Defender
Strategy
Attacker
Strategy
1 9.960 9.960 0 1
2 2.270 2.270 0 1
3 2.410 1.450 -39.83% -0.960 0 0
4 7.400 7.400 0 1
5 9.921 9.821 -1.01% -0.100 0 0
6 2.710 2.610 -3.69% -0.100 0 1
7 2.820 2.820 1 1
8 8.924 8.711 -2.39% -0.213 0 0
9 10.581 10.581 1 1
10 0.150 0.150 1 1
11 2.046 2.023 -1.12% -0.023 0 0
12 3.192 3.192 1 0
13 3.401 3.401 1 1
14 10.430 9.710 -6.90% -0.720 0 0
15 3.874 3.874 0 1
16 0.179 0.170 -5.24% -0.009 0 1
17 0.274 0.271 -1.13% -0.003 0 0
18 2.640 2.420 -8.33% -0.220 0 0
19 3.883 3.883 0 1
20 3.317 3.250 -2.02% -0.067 0 0
21 0.374 0.374 1 1
22 0.463 0.461 -0.38% -0.002 0 0
23 4.345 4.517 3.97% 0.172 0 0
24 5.303 5.303 1 1
25 1.026 0.918 -10.55% -0.108 0 0
26 4.728 4.812 1.78% 0.084 1 0
Note: Text in bold indicates DO reached the SPNE
Of the 52 total instances examined, tabu search is faster than simulated annealing
in each of them. On average tabu search is 11.47 seconds faster than simulated an-
nealing for IM Type 2A and 10.31 seconds faster for IM Type 2B, with the maximum
diﬀerence in time around 55 seconds. Within Attacker Oracle, simulated annealing
does complete more iterations than tabu search due to the random nature of ex-
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Table 8. DO/TS Expected Survival Value IM Type 2B
Value
DO/TS strategy
comparison with Full
Instance Full DO/TS
Relative
Gap TS
Absolute
Gap TS
Defender
Strategy
Attacker
Strategy
1 9.960 9.960 0 1
2 2.410 1.450 -39.83% -0.960 0 0
3 2.410 1.450 -39.83% -0.960 0 0
4 9.921 9.821 -1.01% -0.100 0 0
5 9.921 9.821 -1.01% -0.100 0 0
6 2.820 2.820 1 1
7 2.820 2.820 1 1
8 10.581 10.581 1 1
9 10.581 10.581 1 1
10 0.150 0.150 1 1
11 2.521 2.521 1 1
12 3.401 3.401 1 1
13 3.401 3.401 1 1
14 18.900 18.957 0.30% 0.057 0 0
15 3.874 3.874 0 1
16 0.274 0.162 -40.88% -0.112 0 0
17 0.326 0.192 -41.00% -0.134 0 0
18 3.882 3.756 -3.24% -0.126 0 0
19 5.373 5.373 0 1
20 4.132 4.132 1 1
21 0.461 0.461 1 1
22 0.500 0.500 1 1
23 5.295 5.303 0.15% 0.008 0 0
24 6.582 6.582 1 1
25 1.196 1.196 1 1
26 5.381 5.381 0 1
Note: Text in bold indicates DO reached the SPNE
ploring neighbors which explains one reason for the diﬀerence in computation times.
While this comparison helps illustrate the diﬀerence in computation time required by
the two heuristics, a direct comparison is not entirely accurate. A more comparable
measure would also include the number of iterations Double Oracle performed before
converging, as this may also account for the diﬀerence in computation time. Table
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6 also shows that simulated annealing fails in one more instance above the SPNE
but in the same number of instances below the SPNE, compared to tabu search.
While DO/TS results in a larger average optimality gap both below and above the
SPNE than DO/SA, the average absolute optimality gap and the maximum absolute
optimality gap are both lower. As Tables 7 and 8 illustrate this is due to DO/TS
failing most often when the SPNE is ≤ 3, where deviations will result in a large rela-
tive optimality gap but not necessarily a large absolute optimality gap, as discussed
previously.
Figure 3 provides an illustration of the diﬀerent cases in which either DO/SA or
DO/TS fail to identify the SPNE along with the frequency with which they occur.
In Cases 1 to 5, DO/TS returns a value less than the optimal SPNE, in Cases 6 to 8
DO/TS successfully attains the optimal SPNE, and in Cases 9 to 13 DO/TS returns
a value larger than optimal. Case 7 is the ideal outcome in which both DO/SA and
DO/TS properly identify the SPNE and also has the highest frequency, occurring 23
out of the 52 test instances. The case with the next highest frequency is Case 2 which
is also intriguing because this indicates that both DO/SA and DO/TS failed below
the SPNE, and they terminated at the same value. Lastly, of the 29 instances for
which either DO/SA and/or DO/TS fail, there are 18 instances in which they both
fail.
5.4 Initializing DO with Multiple Defender/Attacker Strategies
In an attempt to improve the performance of Double Oracle, we test the eﬀect of
initializing DO with multiple defender and attacker strategies on the solution qual-
ity. We generate three new defender strategies and two new attacker strategies in
addition to the single strategies used above to initialize Double Oracle. The expec-
tation of adding these additional strategies is that they will either (a) improve the
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Figure 3. Cases in which DO/TS and/or DO/SA Fail
solution quality in instances which Double Oracle failed by reaching new portions of
the strategy space, and/or (b) reduce the computation time by reaching portions of
the strategy space quicker. Thus, by adding these new strategies we do not expect
the performance to be any worse than the initial results.
The ﬁrst new defender strategy included in the initial restricted game is the so-
lution to the weighted maximum covering problem formulated in (6a) - (6f). The
variable dqi is again the decision to locate a SAM battery with IM of type q at loca-
tion i and rj indicates whether city j is covered by a SAM battery or not.
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Weighted Max Covering:
max
d,r
∑
j∈N
vjrj (6a)
s.t. rj ≤
∑
i∈F
∑
q∈T
aqijd
q
i , ∀j ∈ N, (6b)
∑
i∈F
dqi = mq, ∀q ∈ T, (6c)∑
q∈T
dqi ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ F, (6d)
dqi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀i ∈ F, q ∈ T, (6e)
rj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀j ∈ N. (6f)
The objective function in (6a) represents the objective to maximize the weighted
value of cities covered by a SAM battery, where the weight assigned to each city is
its city value vj. Constraint (6b) requires that a SAM battery can only cover a city
if the city is within range of the SAM battery while Constraint (6c) requires that all
SAM batteries with missiles of type q are employed. Constraint (6d) enforces that no
more than one SAM battery will be placed at any location and Constraints (6e) and
(6f) enforce binary integer restrictions on the decision to locate a SAM battery at a
city and the decision to cover a city, respectively.
The second new defender strategy included in the initial restricted game utilizes a
greedy heuristic to place a SAM battery at the most valuable city that is not covered
by a SAM battery already placed. In this strategy the ﬁrst SAM battery is always
placed at the most valuable city. The next SAM battery is placed at the next most
valuable city uncovered, given the placement of the ﬁrst SAM battery. For example,
if the SAM battery at City 1 also covers City 2 but not City 3, then the second
SAM battery would be placed at City 3. If all cities are covered and there are SAM
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batteries remaining, the SAM batteries are sequentially placed at the most valuable
city without a SAM battery.
The ﬁnal new defender strategy included in the initial restricted game is the
opposite of the single initialization strategy. Instead of SAM batteries being placed
in sequential order at the most valuable city without a SAM battery, SAM batteries
are placed in sequential order at the least valuable city without a SAM battery. This
strategy is added in an attempt to diversify the set of initialization strategies.
As previously mentioned, we generate two new attacker strategies to add to the
initialization set. The ﬁrst strategy assigns AMs to cities based on the city value.
This strategy assigns wj =
⌈ vj∑
j∈N
vj
n
⌉
AMs to each city j until all n missiles have been
allocated.
The second new attacker strategy included in the initial restricted game itera-
tively assigns AMs to the city with the highest expected city survival value given the
allocation of previous AMs. Let vkj represent the expected city survival value and
wkj represent the number of AMs targeting city j after k AMs have been allocated.
Initially, v0j = vj and the allocation of AMs continues until k = n. At each iter-
ation the next attacker missile is assigned to the city with the largest vkj value. If
wkj = w
k−1
j , implying that the k
th AM is not targeting city j, then the expected value
remains unchanged and vkj = v
k−1
j . If the k
th attacker missile is assigned to target
city j, then wkj 6= wk−1j and the expected city survival value is updated according to
vkj = v
k−1
j pmax, where pmax = max
q
pq.
Since DO/TS will always return the same output assuming the same heuristic
parameter settings and same initialization strategies, we know that any alteration to
the performance of DO/TS from initializing Double Oracle with single defender/at-
tacker strategies will result from the additional strategies in the initialization set. Due
to the stochastic element of simulated annealing, the same will not necessarily hold
54
true; however, the results from DO/TS may be used to infer eﬀects (i.e., if DO/SA
performs better and DO/TS performs better, it is likely DO/SA improved due to the
diﬀerent initialization strategies).
5.5 Multiple Strategy Initialization Test Instance Results
The same 26 instances for IM Type 2A and IM Type 2B are tested again to see
what eﬀect initializing Double Oracle with multiple defender and attacker strategies
will have. Tables 9, 10, 11, and 12 provide the results from initializing Double Oracle
with multiple strategies, along with the original results from full enumeration. Table
13 again summarizes the performance in those instances in which DO/SA and DO/TS
fail to identify the SPNE.
Overall, initializing Double Oracle with multiple defender and attacker strategies
improves DO/SA both in terms of computation time and solution quality. There
are 45 instances that required a smaller computation time, with a majority of these
instances completing approximately 2 to 4 seconds faster. DO/SA also fails in fewer
instances below the SPNE than previously and results in a smaller average and max-
imum value diﬀerence. In addition, there are eight new instances for which DO/SA
attains the SPNE and for which it previously failed. Again, it is important to note
that this may not always be the outcome as the performance of simulated anneal-
ing will most likely vary each time it is run, and thus it is diﬃcult to conclude that
this diﬀerence in performance is solely attributed to initializing Double Oracle with
multiple strategies.
DO/TS also improves upon single strategy initialization both in terms of compu-
tation time and solution quality. Of the 52 total test instances, initializing Double
Oracle with multiple strategies reduces the computation time in 48 instances, with a
maximum reduction time just under 3 seconds. While DO/TS already performs very
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Table 9. DO/SA Results with Multiple Strategy Initialization for IM Type A
Time (sec) Value
Instance Full DO/SA Full DO/SA
Relative
Gap SA
Absolute
Gap SA
1 15.84 2.74 9.960 9.960
2 94.98 4.60 2.270 2.270
3 93.62 1.40 2.410 2.410
4 95.65 7.46 7.400 7.400
5 91.63 6.97 9.921 9.921*
6 200.07 8.00 2.710 2.610 -3.69% -0.100
7 187.12 1.38 2.820 2.820
8 196.53 4.76 8.924 8.711 -2.39% -0.213
9 187.84 4.11 10.581 10.581
10 1002.22 10.67 0.150 0.150*
11 1140.25 7.22 2.046 2.046*
12 1002.77 5.63 3.192 3.192
13 979.47 2.98 3.401 3.401
14 1006.36 5.55 10.430 10.400 -0.29% -0.030
15 1332.72 4.72 3.874 3.874
16 1839.85 9.14 0.179 0.217 20.86% 0.037
17 1723.53 22.32 0.274 0.274*
18 1876.66 15.48 2.640 2.517 -4.67% -0.123
19 1733.28 6.11 3.883 3.8821 -0.02% -0.001
20 13422.77 15.94 3.317 3.309 -0.24% -0.008
21 4210.00 7.30 0.374 0.374
22 4079.74 12.09 0.463 0.461 -0.38% -0.002
23 4915.87 12.57 4.345 4.109 -5.44% -0.236
24 3571.13 10.48 5.303 5.303
25 10333.44 11.75 1.026 1.019 -0.70% -0.007
26 31282.68 38.77 4.728 4.734 0.12% 0.006
Text in bold indicates DO reached the SPNE
* indicates improvement over single strategy initialization
1 indicates DO optimal with single strategy initialization but failed with
multiple strategy
quickly and this reduction does not appear too large, this diﬀerence may become
more noticeable on larger-sized instances or networks. Tables 11 and 12 also identify
12 instances for which DO/TS now properly identiﬁes the SPNE, but for which it
failed when initialized with a single defender/attacker strategy. As Table 13 shows,
56
Table 10. DO/SA Results with Multiple Strategy Initialization for IM Type B
Time (sec) Value
Instance Full DO/SA Full DO/SA
Relative
Gap SA
Absolute
Gap SA
1 15.69 5.35 9.960 9.960
2 92.09 7.36 2.410 2.410
3 94.17 10.56 2.410 2.410
4 93.19 5.39 9.921 9.921*
5 92.99 6.74 9.921 9.921*
6 191.76 2.75 2.820 2.820
7 189.93 2.75 2.820 2.820
8 190.87 4.11 10.581 10.581
9 189.93 6.91 10.581 10.581
10 971.47 15.14 0.150 0.169 12.67% 0.019
11 1183.04 14.85 2.521 2.521
12 980.67 4.53 3.401 3.401
13 979.13 5.79 3.401 3.401
14 976.86 30.47 18.900 18.962 0.33% 0.062
15 997.60 6.06 3.874 3.874
16 1808.44 19.37 0.274 0.2811 2.30% 0.006
17 1652.89 14.23 0.326 0.3271 0.48% 0.002
18 1826.66 12.66 3.882 3.888 0.16% 0.006
19 1647.21 11.59 5.373 5.373*
20 8659.12 19.21 4.132 4.132*
21 4226.24 19.56 0.461 0.462 0.08% <0.001
22 3404.64 9.07 0.500 0.500
23 4219.76 21.59 5.295 5.197 -1.86% -0.098
24 3403.84 12.52 6.582 6.6131 0.48% 0.032
25 9716.15 15.67 1.196 1.2601 5.35% 0.064
26 19993.36 26.15 5.381 5.291 -1.67% -0.090
Text in bold indicates DO reached the SPNE
* indicates improvement over single strategy initialization
1 indicates DO optimal with single strategy initialization but failed with
multiple strategy
initializing Double Oracle with multiple strategies also improves the performance of
DO/TS in every measure when it predicts an equilibrium below the optimal SPNE.
This is attributed to two main eﬀects, the ﬁrst simply that DO/TS fails in fewer
instances. The second, as Tables 11 and 12 show, is that there are multiple instances
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where DO/TS still fails but results in a smaller optimality gap. Interestingly, initial-
izing Double Oracle with multiple strategies had no eﬀect on those instances where
DO/TS failed above the SPNE. The reason for this unchanged performance is not
immediately clear and warrants further investigation to determine the cause.
Table 11. DO/TS Results with Multiple Strategy Initialization for IM Type A
Time (sec) Value
Instance Full DO/TS Full DO/TS
Relative
Gap TS
Absolute
Gap TS
1 15.84 0.19 9.960 9.960
2 94.98 0.72 2.270 2.270
3 93.62 0.18 2.410 2.410*
4 95.65 1.39 7.400 7.400
5 91.63 0.55 9.921 9.921*
6 200.07 0.70 2.710 2.610 -3.69% -0.100
7 187.12 0.17 2.820 2.820
8 196.53 0.57 8.924 8.711 -2.39% -0.213
9 187.84 0.17 10.581 10.581
10 1002.22 1.29 0.150 0.150
11 1140.25 0.98 2.046 2.046*
12 1002.77 1.18 3.192 3.192
13 979.47 0.41 3.401 3.401
14 1006.36 1.05 10.430 9.710 -6.90% -0.720
15 1332.72 0.48 3.874 3.874
16 1839.85 1.00 0.179 0.179*
17 1723.53 1.64 0.274 0.274*
18 1876.66 2.30 2.640 2.517 -4.67% -0.123
19 1733.28 1.12 3.883 3.8821 -0.02% -0.001
20 13422.77 2.80 3.317 3.309 -0.24% -0.008
21 4210.00 0.80 0.374 0.374
22 4079.74 1.80 0.463 0.461 -0.38% -0.002
23 4915.87 1.11 4.345 4.517 3.97% 0.172
24 3571.13 1.84 5.303 5.303
25 10333.44 1.02 1.026 1.011 -1.49% -0.015
26 31282.68 3.39 4.728 4.812 1.78% 0.084
Text in bold indicates DO reached the SPNE
* indicates improvement over single strategy initialization
1 indicates DO optimal with single strategy initialization but failed with
multiple strategy
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Table 12. DO/TS Results with Multiple Strategy Initialization for IM Type B
Time (sec) Value
Instance Full DO/TS Full DO/TS
Relative
Gap TS
Absolute
Gap TS
1 15.69 0.18 9.960 9.960
2 92.09 0.39 2.410 2.410*
3 94.17 0.30 2.410 2.410*
4 93.19 0.55 9.921 9.921*
5 92.99 0.55 9.921 9.921*
6 191.76 0.17 2.820 2.820
7 189.93 0.17 2.820 2.820
8 190.87 0.17 10.581 10.581
9 189.93 0.18 10.581 10.581
10 971.47 1.45 0.150 0.150
11 1183.04 1.13 2.521 2.521
12 980.67 0.36 3.401 3.401
13 979.13 0.52 3.401 3.401
14 976.86 1.43 18.900 18.957 0.30% 0.057
15 997.60 0.54 3.874 3.874
16 1808.44 1.10 0.274 0.274*
17 1652.89 1.48 0.326 0.326*
18 1826.66 1.23 3.882 3.882*
19 1647.21 0.44 5.373 5.373
20 8659.12 0.61 4.132 4.132
21 4226.24 1.18 0.461 0.461
22 3404.64 0.84 0.500 0.500
23 4219.76 2.26 5.295 5.303 0.15% 0.008
24 3403.84 0.39 6.582 6.582
25 9716.15 1.12 1.196 1.196
26 19993.36 1.60 5.381 5.2911 -1.67% -0.090
Text in bold indicates DO reached the SPNE
* indicates improvement over single strategy initialization
1 indicates DO optimal with single strategy initialization but failed with
multiple strategy
A ﬁnal point worthy of discussion are those instances for which Double Oracle
succeeded in identifying the SPNE when initialized with a single defender/attacker
strategy but failed to properly identify the SPNE with the addition of new strategies.
Since DO/SA randomly explores the strategy space, it is harder to determine the
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Table 13. DO Performance with Multiple Strategy Initialization
DO/SA DO/TS
Below SPNE Above SPNE Below SPNE Above SPNE
# of instances 11 10 9 4
Average % -1.94% 4.28% -2.38% 1.55%
Max % -5.44% 20.86% -6.90% 3.97%
Average Value Diﬀ -0.083 0.023 -0.141 0.080
Max Value Diﬀ -0.236 0.064 -0.720 0.172
cause of this outcome. One advantage of DO/TS is that it will always return the
same output, allowing us to investigate the cause of this diﬀerence.
There is one instance (i.e., instance 19) for IM Type 2A and one instance (i.e.,
instance 26) for IM Type 2B where such a failure occurs for DO/TS. In both of these
instances, the expected value returned is smaller than the SPNE, implying that the
defender is not doing as well as it could. We explore this disparity by observing
the strategies returned from coreLP, Attacker Oracle, and Defender Oracle upon
completion of each iteration from initializing Double Oracle with single strategies,
and then with multiple strategies.
In both instances when Double Oracle is initialized with a single defender/attacker
strategy, the optimal defender strategy is a best response to the attacker strategy of
allocating all n missiles to the ﬁrst city. When the newly generated attacker strategies
are added to the initialization set, the attacker no longer selects this strategy from
the set of strategies available. As a result, the optimal defender strategy is no longer
returned as a best response in Defender Oracle. This is not to say that the ﬁrst
attacker strategy is the only one that causes the optimal defender best response, but
none of the other attacker strategies in the initialization set or those generated out
of Attacker Oracle induce this defender best response strategy.
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5.6 Implementation Note
The ﬁnal test instances with the results provided in Tables 4 through 12 were run
on the computer with speciﬁcations given in Section 5.3. When ﬁrst developing the
code in MATLAB, these instances were occasionally run on various other computers.
All computers executed the same set of code and invoked the same version of CPLEX
solving each instance. An interesting result of utilizing diﬀerent computers is that
there exist a few instances within the test set for which diﬀerent computers returned
diﬀerent expected values for DO/TS when additional initialization strategies were uti-
lized. Speciﬁcally, a few computers solved Instance 19 for IM Type 2A and Instance
26 for IM Type 2B optimally, whereas the ﬁnal test computer failed for these two
instances. After examining each iteration of Double Oracle, we were able to attribute
the cause of this diﬀerence to one factor: the presence of alternative optima when
solving the weighted max covering problem. The computers returned diﬀerent opti-
mal strategies to the weighted max covering problem, so the initialization strategies
created for Double Oracle were not the same on all computers.
This disparity highlights an important feature of the problem in that (a) it clearly
shows that the initialization strategies have an eﬀect on the performance of Double
Oracle, and (b) the presence of alternative optimal strategies impacts the performance
of Double Oracle. From Table 4, for example, we found that there are alternative
optimal defender/attacker strategies to the full game in those instances where DO/TS
did attain the SPNE values but returned a diﬀerent strategy (or strategies) than
reported by full enumeration. This implies that, when we solve Defender Oracle for
the optimal defender strategy given a ﬁxed attacker strategy sˆa, the strategy returned
may aﬀect the ability of DO/TS to attain the SPNE if there are alternative defender
best response strategies.
Due to this observation, it may be worth considering solving for these alternative
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optima if they exist. However, returning to the weighted max covering problem,
there are multiple instances for which the number of alternative optimal solutions is
upwards of 30, about half the size of the total number of strategies available to the
defender. Therefore, it is not practical to initialize Double Oracle with this many
strategies, especially in larger instances, as the eﬀect on increasing computation time
would be too large to be of value.
5.7 Initialization Pairs
As a ﬁnal focus of analysis within Double Oracle, we initialize the restricted game
with each combination of defender/attacker strategies from the multiple initialization
strategy set. There are four initial defender strategies and three initial attacker
strategies, for a total of 12 combinations. D1 and A1 represent the defender and
attacker strategies used in single strategy initialization as discussed in Section 5.1,
respectively. D2 represents the defender strategy to the solution of the weighted max
covering problem, D3 represents the defender strategy using the greedy allocation
of SAMs to uncovered cities, and D4 represents the last defender strategy of all
SAM batteries at the the least valuable cities. A2 represents the attacker strategy of
assigning wj =
⌈ vj∑
j∈N
vj
n
⌉
AMs to each city j, and A3 represents the attacker strategy
of iteratively assigning AM to the most valuable city based on the expected value of
all previously assigned missiles.
The results from initializing Double Oracle with each strategy pair are provided
in Tables 14 and 15. In this sense, the term `initialization pair' refers to the speciﬁc
combination of a single defender/ single attacker initialization strategy combination
(e.g., D1A3). First, note that these results are only provided for DO/TS and, because
the combination D1A1 represents the same initialization pair as the original results
in Section 5.3, they have been omitted from these tables. The attacker strategy A2
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and A3 are also identical for the ﬁrst instance with only 5 AM available and, as a
result, the strategy A3 was omitted from the initialization pair.
Tables 14 and 15 provide further insight into the performance of Double Oracle.
First, across all 52 instances, there are 16 instances for which all 12 initialization
pairs successfully identify the SPNE. In addition, there are 10 instances in which all
initialization pairs fail to identify the SPNE. Of the 10 instances for which all fail,
there are 3 instances for which all 12 initialization pairs fail at the same SPNE value.
This is an interesting result as it indicates that the initialization strategies do not
have a large impact on the performance of DO/TS in these instances.
In addition, none of the initialization pairs exactly matches the performance of
DO/TS under multiple strategy initialization, as reported in Tables 11 and 12. Fur-
ther, if we compare each combination of initialization pairs (i.e., D1A1 with D1A2,
D1A1 with D1A3, . . ., D4A2 with D4A3), no two combinations yield the exact same
performance. That is, no combination of initialization pairs identify the same SPNE
value for every instance. This indicates that each defender/attacker strategy in the
multiple strategy initialization set contributes to the performance of Double Oracle
and as a result, each strategy is important to include in the initialization set. Subse-
quently, Tables 14 and 15 again illustrate how the performance of Double Oracle can
vary with diﬀerent initialization strategies.
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Table 14. DO/TS Results with Single Strategy Initialization Combinations for IM Type A
Instance Full D1 A2 D1 A3 D2 A1 D2 A2 D2 A3 D3 A1 D3 A2 D3 A3 D4 A1 D4 A2 D4 A3
1 9.960 9.960 9.960 9.960 9.960 9.960 9.960 9.960
2 2.270 2.270 2.270 2.270 2.270 2.270 2.270 2.270 2.270 2.270 2.270 2.270
3 2.410 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410*
4 7.400 7.400 7.400 7.400 7.0711 7.0711 7.400 7.0711 7.0711 7.400 7.400 7.400
5 9.921 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.821 9.821 9.821
6 2.710 2.610 2.610 2.570 2.570 2.570 2.570 2.570 2.570 2.570 2.570 2.570
7 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820
8 8.924 8.711 8.711 8.711 8.711 8.711 8.711 8.711 8.711 8.711 8.711 8.711
9 10.581 10.581 10.581 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811
10 0.150 0.1461 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.1461 0.150 0.150 0.1461 0.150
11 2.046 1.725 2.023 2.046* 2.046* 2.046* 2.023 1.725 2.023 2.023 2.023 2.023
12 3.192 3.192 3.192 3.192 3.192 3.192 3.192 3.192 3.192 3.192 3.192 3.192
13 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401
14 10.430 9.500 9.710 9.710 16.500 9.710 9.710 14.900 9.710 9.710 17.832 9.710
15 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874
16 0.179 0.136 0.170 0.170 0.136 0.170 0.179* 0.179* 0.179* 0.179* 0.136 0.170
17 0.274 0.271 0.274* 0.271 0.271 0.271 0.274* 0.274* 0.274* 0.271 0.271 0.274*
18 2.640 2.420 2.229 2.517 3.026 3.026 2.420 2.420 2.420 2.517 2.517 2.517
19 3.883 3.883 3.883 3.6071 3.8821 3.8821 3.8821 3.8821 3.8821 3.6211 3.8821 3.6211
20 3.317 3.309 3.309 3.111 3.245 3.245 3.149 3.245 3.221 3.149 3.245 2.886
21 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.374 0.374
22 0.463 0.461 0.461 0.461 0.456 0.461 0.461 0.456 0.456 0.461 0.456 0.456
23 4.345 4.517 4.517 4.517 4.517 4.517 4.517 4.517 4.517 4.517 4.109 4.109
24 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.0451
25 1.026 1.011 0.918 1.011 1.011 1.011 1.011 1.011 0.918 0.918 1.011 0.918
26 4.728 4.812 4.902 4.812 4.728* 4.812 4.812 4.728* 4.058 4.902 4.812 4.112
Text in bold indicates DO reached the SPNE
* indicates improvement over single strategy D1A1 initialization
1 indicates DO optimal with single D1A1 strategy, but failed with new combination
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Table 15. DO/TS Results with Single Strategy Initialization Combinations for IM Type B
Instance Full D1 A2 D1 A3 D2 A1 D2 A2 D2 A3 D3 A1 D3 A2 D3 A3 D4 A1 D4 A2 D4 A3
1 9.960 9.960 9.960 9.960 9.960 9.960 9.960 9.960
2 2.410 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410*
3 2.410 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410* 2.410*
4 9.921 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.821 9.821 9.821
5 9.921 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.921* 9.821 9.821 9.821
6 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820
7 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820 2.820
8 10.581 10.581 10.581 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811
9 10.581 10.581 10.581 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811 10.2811
10 0.150 0.1461 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.150 0.1461 0.150 0.150 0.1461 0.150
11 2.521 2.521 2.521 2.521 2.521 2.521 2.521 2.521 2.521 2.521 2.521 2.521
12 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401
13 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401 3.401
14 18.900 18.957 18.957 18.957 18.957 18.957 18.957 18.957 18.957 18.957 18.957 18.957
15 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874 3.874
16 0.274 0.160 0.162 0.247 0.160 0.162 0.274* 0.274* 0.274* 0.247 0.160 0.162
17 0.326 0.192 0.311 0.311 0.192 0.311 0.326* 0.326* 0.326* 0.311 0.196 0.311
18 3.882 3.882* 3.882* 3.385 3.321 3.882* 3.882* 3.882* 3.882* 3.385 3.385 3.385
19 5.373 5.373 5.373 5.373 5.373 5.373 5.373 5.373 5.373 5.1891 5.373 5.1891
20 4.132 4.132 4.132 4.132 4.132 4.132 4.132 4.132 4.132 4.132 4.132 4.132
21 0.461 0.461 0.461 0.461 0.4001 0.4271 0.461 0.4001 0.4231 0.461 0.4001 0.4001
22 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.4791 0.500 0.500 0.4791
23 5.295 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.303 5.303
24 6.582 6.582 6.582 6.582 6.582 6.582 5.8821 6.582 5.8821 6.582 6.582 6.582
25 1.196 1.196 1.196 1.196 1.196 1.196 1.196 1.196 1.196 1.196 1.196 1.196
26 5.381 5.2911 5.381 5.381 5.2911 5.381 5.381 5.2911 5.381 5.381 5.2911 5.381
Text in bold indicates DO reached the SPNE
* indicates improvement over single strategy D1A1 initialization
1 indicates DO optimal with single D1A1 strategy, but failed with new combination
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Finally, there is only one initialization strategy pair that appears to dominate
another strategy pair, meaning it matches the performance and successfully reaches
the SPNE in at least one additional instance. This is the initialization pair D1A3,
which dominates D1A1. The pair D1A3 successfully identiﬁes the SPNE for Instance
17 on IM Type 2A, and it is also the only pair that does not fail in an instances for
which D1A1 was successful.
5.8 Full Enumeration IM Swap
At this point, we return focus to DAD Model 1. Recall that the main diﬀerence in
this model compared to DAD Model 2 is that the defender is able to launch multiple
types of IMs to protect any given city. While this is a more diﬃcult model to solve,
we can use the stage 3 strategy identiﬁed by full enumeration for DAD Model 2 as
a starting feasible solution, and examine IM Swaps based on this solution. In doing
so, we deﬁne an IM swap in one of two ways. For IM Swap 1, we ﬁrst determine
the number of IM Type 2 remaining and the cities within range capable of being
protected by these missiles. If there is a city within range that is currently protected
using only IM Type 1, we begin to substitute IM Type 2 for IM Type 1, thereby
mixing IM types used to protect the city. If there are multiple cities within range
currently protected using IM Type 1, we begin the swap at the most valuable city.
IM Swap 2 is not a swap of IMs used; rather it allows the defender to use previously
unallocated IMs to protect a new city by mixing IM types. In such a search, we begin
with the most valuable city currently not protected and determine the number of IM
of both types that could be used to protect the city. If the total number is at least as
large as the number of AMs, we begin allocating IMs to defend the city until enough
IMs have been allocated to match incoming AMs one to one, starting with IM Type
2.
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In applying the above IM Swaps to the solution from full enumeration, there is
the possibility that the order the swaps are applied will be important in terms of
the increase in the defender's expected utility. As such, we apply the IM Swap in
both orders. That is, we perform one iteration in which we use the full enumeration
solution and apply IM Swap 1 followed by IM Swap 2, and one iteration in which we
apply IM Swap 2 followed by IM Swap 1. The larger expected utility to the defender
of the two is then selected.
Table 16 provides the results for applying this swap technique for IM Type 2A,
and Table 17 provides the results for IM Type 2B. Further, since this swap is not guar-
anteed to increase the defender's expected value (and it will never decrease it), results
are only reported for instances in which the defender's expected value increased.
Table 16. Full Enumeration SPNE Value IM Swap Type 2A
Instance Full IM Swap Increase in SPNE
8 8.924 9.343 0.420
14 10.430 12.524 2.094
18 2.640 2.643 0.003
20 3.317 3.357 0.040
21 0.374 0.405 0.031
22 0.463 0.484 0.021
23 4.345 4.450 0.106
24 5.303 5.528 0.226
26 4.728 4.784 0.056
Table 17. Full Enumeration SPNE Value IM Swap Type 2B
Instance Full IM Swap Increase in SPNE
21 0.461 0.473 0.012
23 5.295 5.377 0.082
Table 16 and 17 show that the largest increase in the SPNE is 2.094 for instance
14 with IM Type 2A. Returning to Table 2, we note that this is also the instance
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in which p2 = 1, and this is attributed as the main cause for the large increase.
Excluding this instance, the largest increase in the SPNE is 0.420, with a majority
of the instances increasing the SPNE by less than 0.100. There are two main factors
for this small change in SPNE. First, the pq-values are relatively close together, so
mixing IM types to protect a city will not drastically change the SPNE. Secondly,
the largest increase in SPNE would arise as a result of protecting a city that was
previously unprotected. Returning to the DAD Model 2 full enumeration solution,
a majority of the cities are already protected. In fact, the fewest number of cities
protected is three, and this only occurs in a few instances. Thus, the only real change
is mixing IMs utilized on an already protected city, which as previously mentioned
will not cause a large change. While this IM swap technique is not an exact solution
method, it does provide an indication that the assumption limiting the defender to at
most one IM type employed to protect a city is not too constricting on the defender.
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VI. Conclusions
6.1 Summary
With the continual advancement of technology and evolving threats around the
world, missile defense remains a key area that accounts for billions of dollars in the
U.S. acquisition process alone. As new technologies and weapon systems are intro-
duced, each brings unique capabilities to help combat this threat. While current
systems such as the THAAD, Patriot, and AEGIS are capable of providing protec-
tion, the focus is beginning to shift towards more cost eﬀect alternatives capable of
providing the necessary protection against an overwhelming attack [12]. A defender
may need to protect a large, dispersed area, and close attention must be given to
properly allocate defensive resources in order to maximize the utility of each system.
This is a problem faced not only by the U.S. but by nations around the world. As
Goure [13] argues, this requires a coordinated eﬀort that takes full advantage of the
capabilities available in any given area. The above factors, along with the ramiﬁca-
tions for the failure to deal with such a threat, contribute towards the necessity for
the research and advancement of air defense systems and their deployment.
The problem of properly positioning air defense systems may seem simple, but
the defender must select a single strategy to implement from an overwhelmingly large
number of those available. We observed that solving the problem exactly via enu-
meration may be plausible for instances of small-size, but the time required increases
too sharply to remain tractable for realistically-sized instances. Even by leveraging
the assumption of a perfect information game and eliminating defender or attacker
strategies at appropriate stages, this method still required several hours to complete.
In contrast, Double Oracle oﬀers the advantage of signiﬁcantly reducing the compu-
tation time required at the potential cost of converging to a solution that incorrectly
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approximates the SPNE. While this may be concerning, it appears that the optimal-
ity gap is not large enough to completely discount the use of Double Oracle as a
viable solution method. This is the case whether simulated annealing or tabu search
was used to solve the Attacker Oracle subproblem within Double Oracle, as both
heuristics have unique features that can be leveraged.
Further, the performance of Double Oracle can be improved by altering its imple-
mentation. This was observed by adding new strategies to the initial restricted game,
and the success of Double Oracle properly identifying the SPNE in a larger num-
ber of instances than under single strategy initialization. In the ﬁnal test instances
with the additional initialization strategies, we note that the average computation
time required by Double Oracle utilizing tabu search to solve Attacker Oracle is 0.95
seconds, a signiﬁcant improvement over implementing full enumeration. For those
instances for which Double Oracle failed to properly identify the SPNE, the average
relative deviation is less than 2.5%, which equates to an absolute deviation in SPNE
value of approximately 0.13. Lastly, in the event that the defender utilizes mixed IM
types to protect a city, we have not found this to have a large eﬀect on the change in
the expected survival value of the city, assuming the pq-values are relatively close.
6.2 Future Research
While Double Oracle provides a large improvement over full enumeration and even
scales well to solve larger instances, it does come at the potential cost of failing to
properly identify the SPNE. Thus, the improvement in the implementation of Double
Oracle yields one such area for further work. One element to consider is solving for
mixed strategies, or alternative optima, when solving for the best response within
Defender and Attacker Oracle. This may increase the computation time required for
Double Oracle, with the beneﬁt of exploring more of the strategy space allowing for
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an improved performance in predicting the SPNE.
Returning to the network topology, another aspect to examine is considering geo-
graphical factors that may be important. If a defense network is designed to provide
protection against a known threat, then the location of this threat may be an im-
portant factor to consider. For example, assume that all AMs will be launched from
one direction (e.g., from the west). In such a scenario, it may be possible for a SAM
battery to protect a city to the east that is outside of the coverage radius, as the
AM will have to ﬂy over this SAM battery ﬁrst. This would allow the defender an-
other factor to consider when placing SAM batteries and also help accurately reﬂect
how additional information can be leveraged when selecting a strategy to implement.
Such a change would likely warrant a new model formulation to accurately address
the diﬀerent aspects that inﬂuence protection capabilities.
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